Queue Management

Although my experience of late has been with a particular “red tail” airline (soon, I hear to be part of the “triangle” airline..), this applies to any service counter.

I fly a lot. As such, I find myself in front of the Sea-Tac airline counter a lot. So much that I recognize most of the people working there. Not so much that they recognize me, but then, I haven’t made a pain of myself either.

Because I fly a lot, I have accumulated the privilege of checking in with the first and business class folks, even if I am in one of the cheap seats, rather than dealing with the little kiosks then waiting for my luggage tag to print out somewhere and hoping that, in the chaos, my luggage tag actually ends up on my luggage. (Another story.. but, take my advice – learn the airport code of where you are going and physically check before your bag goes down the conveyor!)

Anyway, twice in a row now I have been waiting patiently as the single person who is supposed to be providing personal service to the best customers is dealing for a dozen+ minutes trying to re-ticket someone who has had a problem.

I certainly sympathize with the people being re-ticketed, been there, done that, but the question I have is this: Do they really intend for all processing of their very best customers to grind to a halt when this happens?

I would imagine that, if you asked the question of an executive somewhere, the answer would be “Of course not.” But then again, I would also imagine that their corporate executives don’t have to wait in line – even with the very best customers – to check in to their flights, so they never actually experience what their customers do.

Here is how you keep things moving in an administrative process:

  • Set a takt time – the standard time that should be suffecient to process a normal transaction.
  • Keep track of actual time.
  • When actual time hits some alarm threshold – which you get to set, perhaps 110% of takt, then trigger some kind of andon. You have an exception. Processing is now not normal.
  • When this happens, in order to maintain throughput, the exception must be processed as an exception, and the routine should resume its normal pace.

This is how you beat Goldratt’s marching Boy Scouts problem. It is also how you demonstrate to your customers that you understand the very basics of managing queues.

Interesting sidebar – the customer surveys that are available on board the aircraft don’t ask anything about the experience prior to getting into your seat.

Sidebar #2: Today we pulled away from the gate, then went to a parking space and sat for half an hour with the engines shut down. The pilot explained that there was a weather system out there, and air traffic control was increasing spacing. Even though this information was (likely) known prior to boarding, the measurement of “on time” is “pull away from the gate” not “leave the ground” so in order to get an “on time” departure, they will load the plane as scheduled, then go sit on the tarmac rather than delaying the passenger load. A great example of “management by measurement” not getting exactly the intended results.

Hospital Error – Heparin in the news again

Corpus Christi, Texas: Hospital error blamed for more infant overdoses – Yahoo! News

Key points of the story are:

  • 14 babies received heparin overdoses while in intensive care.
  • Two premature twins died, though it is unknown if this was the cause.

…pharmacy workers at Christus Spohn Hospital South made what the hospital called a "mixing error." The two workers went on voluntary leave.

The heparin, which was 100 times stronger than recommended, was given to 14 infants in the hospital’s neonatal intensive care unit on July 4.

As I have cited on previous posts, medication errors are one of the most common ways hospitals unintentionally injure or kill patients in their efforts to treat them.

I am reasonably certain that the two workers who went on "voluntary leave" (yeah, right) will absorb more than their share of blame as the system solves the problem by asking the "Five Who?" questions.

The article then goes on to cite a history of similar incidents in hospitals all over the country, though it is sometimes unclear in the writing if it is talking about this case or a previous one.

So what should happen?

First, determine where the actual root error occurred. If the manufacturer shipped mislabeled product, for example, then the problem happened THERE, not in the hospital. That isn’t to say we can’t do a better job in the hospital catching those things, but that isn’t the root cause in this case.

Any investigation should center on an assumption that the workers were operating in good faith, paying as much attention as can be expected of a normal human being, and were positive that they were doing this right. They did not want to injure or kill their customers.

Somehow, then, the process of mixing (either in the hospital or at the manufacturer) allows a 100x error to go by without SCREAMING for attention. And scream it must. Humans doing routine things in routine ways operate on an assumption that everything is routine until presented with overwhelmingly compelling evidence to the contrary.

Any hunt for "who did it" is motivated by extracting retribution rather than solving the problem. Once again, I refer the reader to the great work by Sidney Dekker on human error. We can all learn and apply it to everything that people need to do correctly – safety, quality, any other process or procedure.

The Power of Vision

In the last post I brought up the advantage of having a long range plan vs. quarter-to-quarter thinking. I’d like to explore the concept a little more by way of an analogy.

Put yourself in the spring of 1961.
The USSR, by all demonstrative measures, is ahead of the USA in human space flight, and seems to be increasing that lead. On April 12, Yuri Gagarin orbited the Earth. On May 5, Alan Shepard went up, and came down on a 15 minute trajectory.

At the time, there were important geo-political reasons for establishing a public perception of technological leadership, and space exploration seemed to be the place to do it.

On May 25, President Kennedy made a public commitment to regain, and maintain, that leadership. He could have done it with corporate-speak:

This nation will become the world leader in space exploration.

But he didn’t. He said:

“I believe that this nation should commit itself, to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon, and returning him safely to the Earth.”

Only the second statement is actionable. Only the second statement carries the possibility of failure. And only the second statement galvanizes action. In pursuing that goal with that degree of commitment, it achieved the first – to demonstrate world leadership in space exploration, not with words, but with action.

Of course the first statement carries no risk, since there is no actual performance requirement. Perhaps that is why corporate-speak carries that kind of language today. The shareholders can’t fire the board for not achieving something that was never articulated. The statement leaves open the capability to re-define the goal so that it matches what was actually done – something that happens all too often in today’s world.

So when one company says “We are going to sell more products next year.” and another says “We are on year 2 of our 10 year plan to be #1 in sales with 15% market share.” which one do you think can align actions of the people in the company?

To continue, when Kennedy made that speech:

  • The United States had a human space flight experience totaling 15 minutes.
  • The world had human space flight experience totaling under 2 hours.

Nobody actually knew, for sure, what the moon was made of.

To be sure, the visionaries within NASA had been thinking about sending someone to the moon for a long time. And in May, 1961 there were competing strategies in play at NASA for getting it done. They either involved an unimaginably HUGE rocket (think twice the size of the one that actually did it), or two or three Saturn class rockets to launch and assemble the lunar spacecraft in orbit. But when faced with a deadline of “before this decade is out,” the challenges were immense. Another strategy, considered a bit crackpot at the time, was named “lunar orbit rendezvous.” It involved a smaller (but still huge) rocket to send a throw-away lander on the moon along with a re-entry capsule. The capsule remains in lunar orbit, the lander lands, takes off, docks with the capsule. The crew transfers to the capsule, and they head home. As each piece fulfilled its intended purpose, it would be discarded.

It became increasingly clear, in the months that followed the speech, that neither of the “mainstream” approaches would get the job done with the time and resources available.

During the summer, consensus formed around the lunar orbit rendezvous scenario.
Key Point: Once they decided to pursue that option all further pursuit of the others was stopped. They committed. They did not have the resources to do otherwise.

In the corporate world, how often does that happen? Once a project, or even an idea, has any kind of resourcing or momentum behind it, stopping it is incredibly difficult. More things to do get added, but it seems that nothing gets taken off. This is equally true of “improvement schemes.” I recall a company that had active people in various improvement initiatives. There was the “Workout” group. There were the TQM people. There were the Six Sigma folks. (It took me a while to realize that the TQM and Sigma people considered each other competitors, where I had initially lumped them in together.) Then there were the “Lean guys” who had just come in. There were also pockets of Theory of Constraints believers, the agile guys, everyone saying they had “the answer.”

Back to NASA.

Landing a person on the moon by the end of the decade was a clearly articulated vision for accomplishing the high level mission of becoming “the world leader in space exploration.” That was the hoshin.

After a round of “catchball” a strategy was selected from the options available. Note that the catchball didn’t negotiate the goal. That was stated. The question was not whether to do it, but how to do it. The strategy was Lunar Orbit Rendezvous (LOR). They committed to the strategy and ceased all distracting activity to focus 100% of their energy on getting it done.

To make LOR work, they had to learn three things:

  1. Can people stay and work together in space for the 10-14 days required for the trip?
  2. Can people work outside the spacecraft in protective suits?
  3. Can one space vehicle locate and dock with another?

We do these things routinely today, but in 1961 nobody knew the answers.

These three things were the ONLY major objectives of Project Gemini.

The fourth big task was to develop the Saturn V as well as the facility to assemble and launch the rockets.

This goal is very sticky.
Any time one of the hundreds of thousands of Team Members working at NASA and in the contractors had a decision to make, the criteria was simple: “Will this action help the effort to put a man on the moon by the end of the decade?” If the answer was “No” then don’t do it. Great idea. But don’t do it. We don’t have the time or energy for the distraction.

The second thing it did, and this is even more important, is in the face of major setback – the Apollo 1 fire in January 1967, the organization was able to recover, regroup and stay on course because they had a sense of destiny. There was a clear goal, and they were working to meet it. It provided a compass that pointed the way when all other navigational references were blacked out.

Contrast this with the way NASA has been run during the Shuttle era. The massive amounts of energy involved in space travel mean this is, and is likely to remain, a risky business. But in the shuttle era, the tragedies seem to have created doubt and loss of confidence. There is no higher purpose other than space flight for its own sake. They are running it like a business.

“But we ARE a business! you may say. Sure you are. But the truly excellent businesses, those with the ability to adapt to changing situations quickly and recover are the ones whose sense of “self” transcends quarterly profits and financials. They are successful because they stand for something more.

A few years ago I remember standing outside in the Seattle area during an earthquake that lasted close to a minute. It was an unsettling experience because the ground itself was moving. Leadership’s job is largely providing a sense of solid ground so everyone else can operate without feeling off balance. This is done with very clear goals that are

  • Simple to understand.
  • Unexpected – they compel attention
  • Concrete – they can be seen, touched, felt.
  • Credible – they make sense in the larger context.
  • Emotional – they appeal to people’s feelings and
  • have Stories – they can be communicated in a way people can visualize.

Kitchen sink “KPI” lists don’t do this.

Long Term Vision vs. Short Term Thinking

Gabriela asked some good questions in a comment on “More Short Term Thinking.”

One of her questions was about Toyota’s apparent lead in hybrid cars. Was it luck, or was it planned?
One answer to that question is in Liker’s book The Toyota Way when he discusses their product development system, specifically using the Prius as an example. They didn’t set out to build a hybrid car. Rather, the goal was to radically improve fuel economy. A lot of things were tried, and hybrid technology just emerged as the way to go. It was, without a doubt, a huge risk.

In 2005, the analysts were skeptical.
May 11, 2005, in The New York Times:
Profit Plunges at Toyota as It Vies for Market Share
From the article:

High gas prices have helped Toyota sell more small cars, like the Corolla sedan and the compact cars in the Scion line. And sales of the gas-sipping Prius hybrid sedan have more than doubled in recent months compared with last year. But analysts say the added sales have not helped Toyota’s bottom line as those vehicles tend to be less profitable than S.U.V.’s and big sedans.

“Even though Toyota’s market share is growing fantastically, Toyota’s profitability is actually in somewhat of a stagnant period,” said Takaki Nakanishi, an auto analyst at UBS Securities Japan.

and from another section:

But Toyota’s heavy investment outlays and its focus on smaller, less profitable vehicles raise questions about whether Toyota managers are more concerned with gaining market share than with increasing profits, said Mr. Nakanishi of UBS, who noted that Toyota’s profit margin had fallen for each of the last three quarters.

Clearly, the profit focused analysts were questioning the heavy R&D commitment to fuel economy when the big profits were clearly in the big SUVs and trucks.

Keep in mind, of course, that this “plunging profit” was still 2.5 billion dollars for the quarter at a time when GM and Ford were showing record sales and recording record losses.

OK – now fast forward
Today, all indicators are that Toyota’s profits are down, just like everyone else’s. But they aren’t recording losses, just earning less than they had. The demand for the Prius has outstripped their battery supplier’s ability to produce, at least in the short term, and they have been able to raise prices on it and other high-mileage models.

Honestly, my opinion is that they developed the hybrid more as a long term commitment to pushing “greener” transportation technology, and as a platform from which to develop other things. I don’t think anyone honestly saw the surge in fuel prices.

Nevertheless, I would contend that Toyota’s generally conservative approach and keeping their eye on the long term serves them better than trying to please the analysts. What we have here is simple: They bucked what the analysts were saying. GM did exactly what they were saying. GM put all of their proverbial eggs into the high-profit big trucks and SUV’s, and they don’t really have a Plan B right now.