Watch out for drug names that look, sound alike

Watch out for drug names that look, sound alike – Yahoo! News

One of the most common errors made in the health care industry is medication – giving the wrong stuff to the patient. There are a lot of root causes, and this article highlights one of them.

I certainly understand that the commercial pharmaceutical industry wants to establish and maintain brand awareness. And I am equally certain that they don’t really consider it "their problem" if "someone doesn’t pay attention" and prescribes the wrong medication; dispenses the wrong medication; administers the wrong medication or takes the wrong medication.

This is one of the problems with a complex system – where a problem originates in one part, but is only felt in another part.

Ultimately the solution is fairly simple. Assign an alpha-numeric code, not to the brand, but to the formulation, including the strength / dosage. Use that code for all bar coding, RF tags, database records, prescriptions, etc.

If it would help, combine that code with colored labels, backgrounds, shapes, etc. Anything to help visual distinguish one product from another.

This is, of course, not a 100% bullet-proof solution. But humans are really poor at distinguishing similar looking words from one another. We don’t see letters, we hear the sounds. This is an appropriate case where technology, which is well suited for this kind of thing, can be a big help.

Will it eliminate all errors? Of course not. Mislabeling or mixing mistakes are also common. But this would attack the problem cited in the article at its root. Then the companies can name their products anything they want, and we also eliminate all kinds of overburden on the already overworked attorneys.

Toyota Profit Slips 28% as Truck Sales Fall

Toyota Profit Slips 28% as Truck Sales Fall – NYTimes.com

This story in yesterday’s online New York Times has a couple of interesting points.

Toyota said its net income fell to 353.7 billion yen ($3.2 billion), in the quarter, compared with 491.5 billion yen in the period a year earlier.

So they, like everyone else, are being hurt by the plunge in big truck sales.

But note that their profits are down. This is different from their losses are up.

their overall results were hardly comparable to the $15.5 billion loss reported by General Motors and the $8.7 billion loss by the Ford Motor Company

Just as a "check" of the financial results, let’s look at market share:

The automaker improved its market share in the United States to 17.4 percent in the quarter, even as its sales volumes declined.

So, yes, their sales are down, but they are down less than everyone else’s.

Now, to be clear, Toyota has issues. Who doesn’t? But, year on year, their management system is delivering the thing that is most important to them: Consistency.

One-off and Customization

One of the questions that comes up frequently in “lean” discussions is the issue of non-repetitive work. This is especially an issue with complex information processes such as bid proposals, estimates, etc.

While it is true that breaking down and understanding truly repetitive work is easier, the same principles apply to more complex tasks.

But first, I’d like to challenge some thinking. If you were to tell me that “every time we do this it is totally custom,” my question would be “If it has never been done before, why can’t everyone do it just as well as you?” What makes up your expertise? Why do your customers come to you?

I’ll answer: Because you know how to do it. Obvious, right? But that’s the point. You have experience, because you have done it before. You have a process of some kind. And you carry out that process to produce your customized product.

Further, you have some kind of idea of what a “defect free product” is. You understand what you want to accomplish.

Complex operations are built up from simple ones. The tasks that are done over and over are these simple operations. These simple operations are great sources of waste because (typically) no one ever examines them.

The idea that “lean” only works for repetitive processes is largely the fault of the “lean industry.” It focuses so much on takt time and removing waste that it has not, so far, gotten to the actual heart of what makes continuous improvement work.

In an ideal repetitive process running to takt time, there are a number of key ingredients.

  • There is a highly specified work sequence that calls out the content, timing, sequence and intended outcome of the work. EVERY time that work sequence is carried out, the actual content, sequence, timing and outcome is being compared to what was specified. ANY departure from the specified work (or result) is going to trigger some kind of immediate response to correct the immediate issue, and then start the process of problem solving to find the reason this happened. This is jidoka.
  • Although I mentioned timing above, the importance of time is elevated. Taiichi Ohno is quoted as saying “Time is the shadow of motion.” Ohno was a great student. The idea that it is important to study motion itself rather than focusing on time comes from the pioneer Frank Gilbreth. In application, by specifying how long each normal operation should take, and checking the actual timing, it is possible to detect when unplanned motions creep into the work. This is the purpose of takt time and work balance. It is no more, and no less, than a tool for verifying planned vs. actual so that action can be taken immediately if there is a difference.
  • There is a specified amount of work-in-process. Each piece has a reason to be there. There is some means of detecting any departure from that standard, and any departure triggers an immediate response to understand why.

As you scale up from a work cell to an entire factory, these mechanisms scale as well, but the principle is always the same:

  • Tightly specify what you expect to do, when it should be done, who should do it, where it should happen, and how it should happen.
  • Tightly specify (understand) the intended “defect free” result of each step.
  • Have a way to verify, continuously, that what you are actually doing (and when, who, where and how) matches what you planned.
  • If When you DETECT any departure from what you specified, STOP pretending you are still running to plan; FIX or CORRECT whatever got you off plan and get back on plan; then work to understand and SOLVE THE PROBLEM. This is how the organization learns and acquires what Deming calls “profound knowledge” of itself and its processes.

In a complex one-off situation, you might never carry out that plan again. But plan carefully, applying everything you know… all of your expertise. Understand the elemental tasks that you do all of the time. Understand how long each should take. Understand what result you should get at each step.

As you carry out the plan, if when there are unforeseen real world issues, STOP long enough to understand their impact and start asking questions. First, what must we do to get this back on track?

If someone had to improvise, why? What knocked him off the plan or process?

If someone had to finish up work he got from upstream, why? Was the specification for a “defect free” transfer vague? Does it need clarification?

This can go on, but the bottom line is that most organizations with complex processes expect their people to accommodate and cope with noise in the system. They say “every time is different, we can’t possibly plan that well.”

The ones who are getting better every day say “We should be able to plan this perfectly. Why couldn’t we this time?” In simply asking that question, they get better each time they do it.

So – in the context of the original question. When putting together a complex bid and proposal, there are (I presume) steps you routinely go through. This is so even if you are not aware of what they are. Study those steps. Study the intermediate products. Understand where one step ends and the next begins. Understand what must be present (information, resources, etc.) for that step to execute successfully. If, at any point, those things are not there then STOP and understand WHY. Don’t just ask the people who SHOULD have those things to go find them.

You wouldn’t have an assembler on the shop floor hunt down missing parts. Don’t have a professional engineer hunt down information he should have received.

Check, at each intermediate step, that it was done as you expect.

At the end of the process, check that the bid is what you want it to be. If it needs rework (meaning someone didn’t approve it), understand why, and work on what information the process didn’t have the first time through. Next time, get it right.

The proposal itself is packaging. It is also your first cut at the plan for execution.

If you get the bid, and execute your plan, any departure from what you originally proposed should be understood. Why? What happened? What didn’t you see coming? Some things are truly different, and you are only estimating. But compare your actual vs. your estimate so that next time you can do a better job estimating.

There will always be imperfections. The question is in whether the organization chooses to bury them in waste or learn from them.

Dealing With High Turnover

Jim left a great post on The Whiteboard way too long ago.

His problems seem to sum up to these statements:

Every valve is hand made one by one in batches through several processes.

…about a 10% turnover rate…Consequently we are always training new people…the supervisor needs to make sure the worker understands the job

My inclination is to somehow explain to the owners how their employee turnover rate is hurting their production and quality.

He titled his post  Hitting The Moving Train which seems appropriate on a number of levels.

Keeping in mind that I have not done my own "go and see" so I don’t have facts from the ground, only what is reported, a couple of immediate things come to mind. Other readers (especially the couple of dozen of you who never leave comments!), feel free to chime in here.

Short term: Stop the batching. Or, more specifically, flow the batches. The key point here is that just because you run batches doesn’t mean you can’t run one-piece-flow. (Pardon the double negative.)

What does that look like here? For each batch of valves, understand all of the assembly operations, set up an ad-hoc flow line that sequences all of the steps, then run them all through.

This does a couple of things, first and foremost, it gets them off the shop floor and shipped a hell of a lot quicker because now they are DONE. The downside is the supervisor needs to teach more than one person his particular sequence steps, but it eliminates all of the routing, traveler paperwork, tracking, prioritizing, and other stuff associated with having those 50 incomplete valves sitting out there. Scheduling becomes "Which jobs are we going to set up and assemble today?"

What about the parts? Don’t start assembling until you have all of the parts.

"Wait a minute, what about just-in-time?" One thing at a time. Let’s not launch a job until we have the capacity and capability of actually doing it for now.

Next, (Intermediate Term): is make the supervisor’s job a bit easier. I am assuming that, since he is training the workers, that he understands the tasks. But does he have formal training on how to break down work into steps and instruct in a way that someone remembers how to do it? Rather than reading a book about it, I would strongly suggest contacting the TWI Institute and getting, first, a handle on Job Instruction. This is, essentially, standard work on how to break down a job and teach someone to do it. The method has been taught unchanged since mid-1944. Not surprisingly, it is bread-and-butter at Toyota… and their material is pretty much verbatim from the 1944 material.. and it is the origin of standard work as we know it.

As jobs are broken down, the inherently critical tasks should emerge. These are the things which must be done a certain way or the thing just won’t go together (bad) or will go together, but won’t work (very, very bad). Those key points are where to start instituting mistake-proofing, successive checks, etc. This will start driving toward stomping out the quality issues.

For each quality issue that comes back to bite, take the time to really understand how it was even possible to make that mistake, and focus a problem solving effort on that key point to (1) incorporate it into the teaching and (2) mistake-proof and successive-check that particular attribute. Defects discovered in the plant are bad enough. Defects discovered by your customers are another story. Do what you must to keep the defects from escaping, then work on preventing them. Don’t cut out inspection just because it is muda.. unless you are 110% certain that your process is totally robust, and any problem that does occur will be caught and corrected immediately. Anyone who thinks Toyota "doesn’t do inspection" has never seen the last 60 or so positions on their assembly line… nor have they seen the checks that are continuously being made during assembly.

And finally – the turnover issue. A couple of things come to mind. First, with the right attitude and approach, the things described above can make this a lot more interesting place to work… especially if the Team Members are involved in finding the solutions to escaping quality issues, etc.

The same goes if supervisors continue to hone their leadership skills. Employee turnover is typically caused as much by the relationship with the first line supervisor and working conditions in general as it is by wages, etc. Southwest Airlines would not exist were that not true. Neither would a couple of other companies I can think of. Go look at "The 100 Best Places to Work" and see that relatively few of them cite "the highest pay and best benefits in the area." This isn’t to say that they do not offer fair, competitive compensation. But compensation, in general, is a relatively poor indicator of job satisfaction. Far more important is a daily demonstration that someone cares and is committed to the Team Member’s success.

If they really like TWI Job Instruction, they might be attracted to Job Relations – standard work for supervisors (first line leaders) for people issues. The TWI Institute has also just launched a new program called Job Safety. This isn’t one of the original TWI classes, but it was put together by experts I know and trust, and from what I have read, it follows the same reliable method format.

With all of that, perhaps the owners will be convinced that a competitive compensation program is a way to say "Thank you" to a great team that busts their butts to keep the customers happy.

Queue Management

Although my experience of late has been with a particular “red tail” airline (soon, I hear to be part of the “triangle” airline..), this applies to any service counter.

I fly a lot. As such, I find myself in front of the Sea-Tac airline counter a lot. So much that I recognize most of the people working there. Not so much that they recognize me, but then, I haven’t made a pain of myself either.

Because I fly a lot, I have accumulated the privilege of checking in with the first and business class folks, even if I am in one of the cheap seats, rather than dealing with the little kiosks then waiting for my luggage tag to print out somewhere and hoping that, in the chaos, my luggage tag actually ends up on my luggage. (Another story.. but, take my advice – learn the airport code of where you are going and physically check before your bag goes down the conveyor!)

Anyway, twice in a row now I have been waiting patiently as the single person who is supposed to be providing personal service to the best customers is dealing for a dozen+ minutes trying to re-ticket someone who has had a problem.

I certainly sympathize with the people being re-ticketed, been there, done that, but the question I have is this: Do they really intend for all processing of their very best customers to grind to a halt when this happens?

I would imagine that, if you asked the question of an executive somewhere, the answer would be “Of course not.” But then again, I would also imagine that their corporate executives don’t have to wait in line – even with the very best customers – to check in to their flights, so they never actually experience what their customers do.

Here is how you keep things moving in an administrative process:

  • Set a takt time – the standard time that should be suffecient to process a normal transaction.
  • Keep track of actual time.
  • When actual time hits some alarm threshold – which you get to set, perhaps 110% of takt, then trigger some kind of andon. You have an exception. Processing is now not normal.
  • When this happens, in order to maintain throughput, the exception must be processed as an exception, and the routine should resume its normal pace.

This is how you beat Goldratt’s marching Boy Scouts problem. It is also how you demonstrate to your customers that you understand the very basics of managing queues.

Interesting sidebar – the customer surveys that are available on board the aircraft don’t ask anything about the experience prior to getting into your seat.

Sidebar #2: Today we pulled away from the gate, then went to a parking space and sat for half an hour with the engines shut down. The pilot explained that there was a weather system out there, and air traffic control was increasing spacing. Even though this information was (likely) known prior to boarding, the measurement of “on time” is “pull away from the gate” not “leave the ground” so in order to get an “on time” departure, they will load the plane as scheduled, then go sit on the tarmac rather than delaying the passenger load. A great example of “management by measurement” not getting exactly the intended results.

Hospital Error – Heparin in the news again

Corpus Christi, Texas: Hospital error blamed for more infant overdoses – Yahoo! News

Key points of the story are:

  • 14 babies received heparin overdoses while in intensive care.
  • Two premature twins died, though it is unknown if this was the cause.

…pharmacy workers at Christus Spohn Hospital South made what the hospital called a "mixing error." The two workers went on voluntary leave.

The heparin, which was 100 times stronger than recommended, was given to 14 infants in the hospital’s neonatal intensive care unit on July 4.

As I have cited on previous posts, medication errors are one of the most common ways hospitals unintentionally injure or kill patients in their efforts to treat them.

I am reasonably certain that the two workers who went on "voluntary leave" (yeah, right) will absorb more than their share of blame as the system solves the problem by asking the "Five Who?" questions.

The article then goes on to cite a history of similar incidents in hospitals all over the country, though it is sometimes unclear in the writing if it is talking about this case or a previous one.

So what should happen?

First, determine where the actual root error occurred. If the manufacturer shipped mislabeled product, for example, then the problem happened THERE, not in the hospital. That isn’t to say we can’t do a better job in the hospital catching those things, but that isn’t the root cause in this case.

Any investigation should center on an assumption that the workers were operating in good faith, paying as much attention as can be expected of a normal human being, and were positive that they were doing this right. They did not want to injure or kill their customers.

Somehow, then, the process of mixing (either in the hospital or at the manufacturer) allows a 100x error to go by without SCREAMING for attention. And scream it must. Humans doing routine things in routine ways operate on an assumption that everything is routine until presented with overwhelmingly compelling evidence to the contrary.

Any hunt for "who did it" is motivated by extracting retribution rather than solving the problem. Once again, I refer the reader to the great work by Sidney Dekker on human error. We can all learn and apply it to everything that people need to do correctly – safety, quality, any other process or procedure.

The Power of Vision

In the last post I brought up the advantage of having a long range plan vs. quarter-to-quarter thinking. I’d like to explore the concept a little more by way of an analogy.

Put yourself in the spring of 1961.
The USSR, by all demonstrative measures, is ahead of the USA in human space flight, and seems to be increasing that lead. On April 12, Yuri Gagarin orbited the Earth. On May 5, Alan Shepard went up, and came down on a 15 minute trajectory.

At the time, there were important geo-political reasons for establishing a public perception of technological leadership, and space exploration seemed to be the place to do it.

On May 25, President Kennedy made a public commitment to regain, and maintain, that leadership. He could have done it with corporate-speak:

This nation will become the world leader in space exploration.

But he didn’t. He said:

“I believe that this nation should commit itself, to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon, and returning him safely to the Earth.”

Only the second statement is actionable. Only the second statement carries the possibility of failure. And only the second statement galvanizes action. In pursuing that goal with that degree of commitment, it achieved the first – to demonstrate world leadership in space exploration, not with words, but with action.

Of course the first statement carries no risk, since there is no actual performance requirement. Perhaps that is why corporate-speak carries that kind of language today. The shareholders can’t fire the board for not achieving something that was never articulated. The statement leaves open the capability to re-define the goal so that it matches what was actually done – something that happens all too often in today’s world.

So when one company says “We are going to sell more products next year.” and another says “We are on year 2 of our 10 year plan to be #1 in sales with 15% market share.” which one do you think can align actions of the people in the company?

To continue, when Kennedy made that speech:

  • The United States had a human space flight experience totaling 15 minutes.
  • The world had human space flight experience totaling under 2 hours.

Nobody actually knew, for sure, what the moon was made of.

To be sure, the visionaries within NASA had been thinking about sending someone to the moon for a long time. And in May, 1961 there were competing strategies in play at NASA for getting it done. They either involved an unimaginably HUGE rocket (think twice the size of the one that actually did it), or two or three Saturn class rockets to launch and assemble the lunar spacecraft in orbit. But when faced with a deadline of “before this decade is out,” the challenges were immense. Another strategy, considered a bit crackpot at the time, was named “lunar orbit rendezvous.” It involved a smaller (but still huge) rocket to send a throw-away lander on the moon along with a re-entry capsule. The capsule remains in lunar orbit, the lander lands, takes off, docks with the capsule. The crew transfers to the capsule, and they head home. As each piece fulfilled its intended purpose, it would be discarded.

It became increasingly clear, in the months that followed the speech, that neither of the “mainstream” approaches would get the job done with the time and resources available.

During the summer, consensus formed around the lunar orbit rendezvous scenario.
Key Point: Once they decided to pursue that option all further pursuit of the others was stopped. They committed. They did not have the resources to do otherwise.

In the corporate world, how often does that happen? Once a project, or even an idea, has any kind of resourcing or momentum behind it, stopping it is incredibly difficult. More things to do get added, but it seems that nothing gets taken off. This is equally true of “improvement schemes.” I recall a company that had active people in various improvement initiatives. There was the “Workout” group. There were the TQM people. There were the Six Sigma folks. (It took me a while to realize that the TQM and Sigma people considered each other competitors, where I had initially lumped them in together.) Then there were the “Lean guys” who had just come in. There were also pockets of Theory of Constraints believers, the agile guys, everyone saying they had “the answer.”

Back to NASA.

Landing a person on the moon by the end of the decade was a clearly articulated vision for accomplishing the high level mission of becoming “the world leader in space exploration.” That was the hoshin.

After a round of “catchball” a strategy was selected from the options available. Note that the catchball didn’t negotiate the goal. That was stated. The question was not whether to do it, but how to do it. The strategy was Lunar Orbit Rendezvous (LOR). They committed to the strategy and ceased all distracting activity to focus 100% of their energy on getting it done.

To make LOR work, they had to learn three things:

  1. Can people stay and work together in space for the 10-14 days required for the trip?
  2. Can people work outside the spacecraft in protective suits?
  3. Can one space vehicle locate and dock with another?

We do these things routinely today, but in 1961 nobody knew the answers.

These three things were the ONLY major objectives of Project Gemini.

The fourth big task was to develop the Saturn V as well as the facility to assemble and launch the rockets.

This goal is very sticky.
Any time one of the hundreds of thousands of Team Members working at NASA and in the contractors had a decision to make, the criteria was simple: “Will this action help the effort to put a man on the moon by the end of the decade?” If the answer was “No” then don’t do it. Great idea. But don’t do it. We don’t have the time or energy for the distraction.

The second thing it did, and this is even more important, is in the face of major setback – the Apollo 1 fire in January 1967, the organization was able to recover, regroup and stay on course because they had a sense of destiny. There was a clear goal, and they were working to meet it. It provided a compass that pointed the way when all other navigational references were blacked out.

Contrast this with the way NASA has been run during the Shuttle era. The massive amounts of energy involved in space travel mean this is, and is likely to remain, a risky business. But in the shuttle era, the tragedies seem to have created doubt and loss of confidence. There is no higher purpose other than space flight for its own sake. They are running it like a business.

“But we ARE a business! you may say. Sure you are. But the truly excellent businesses, those with the ability to adapt to changing situations quickly and recover are the ones whose sense of “self” transcends quarterly profits and financials. They are successful because they stand for something more.

A few years ago I remember standing outside in the Seattle area during an earthquake that lasted close to a minute. It was an unsettling experience because the ground itself was moving. Leadership’s job is largely providing a sense of solid ground so everyone else can operate without feeling off balance. This is done with very clear goals that are

  • Simple to understand.
  • Unexpected – they compel attention
  • Concrete – they can be seen, touched, felt.
  • Credible – they make sense in the larger context.
  • Emotional – they appeal to people’s feelings and
  • have Stories – they can be communicated in a way people can visualize.

Kitchen sink “KPI” lists don’t do this.

Long Term Vision vs. Short Term Thinking

Gabriela asked some good questions in a comment on “More Short Term Thinking.”

One of her questions was about Toyota’s apparent lead in hybrid cars. Was it luck, or was it planned?
One answer to that question is in Liker’s book The Toyota Way when he discusses their product development system, specifically using the Prius as an example. They didn’t set out to build a hybrid car. Rather, the goal was to radically improve fuel economy. A lot of things were tried, and hybrid technology just emerged as the way to go. It was, without a doubt, a huge risk.

In 2005, the analysts were skeptical.
May 11, 2005, in The New York Times:
Profit Plunges at Toyota as It Vies for Market Share
From the article:

High gas prices have helped Toyota sell more small cars, like the Corolla sedan and the compact cars in the Scion line. And sales of the gas-sipping Prius hybrid sedan have more than doubled in recent months compared with last year. But analysts say the added sales have not helped Toyota’s bottom line as those vehicles tend to be less profitable than S.U.V.’s and big sedans.

“Even though Toyota’s market share is growing fantastically, Toyota’s profitability is actually in somewhat of a stagnant period,” said Takaki Nakanishi, an auto analyst at UBS Securities Japan.

and from another section:

But Toyota’s heavy investment outlays and its focus on smaller, less profitable vehicles raise questions about whether Toyota managers are more concerned with gaining market share than with increasing profits, said Mr. Nakanishi of UBS, who noted that Toyota’s profit margin had fallen for each of the last three quarters.

Clearly, the profit focused analysts were questioning the heavy R&D commitment to fuel economy when the big profits were clearly in the big SUVs and trucks.

Keep in mind, of course, that this “plunging profit” was still 2.5 billion dollars for the quarter at a time when GM and Ford were showing record sales and recording record losses.

OK – now fast forward
Today, all indicators are that Toyota’s profits are down, just like everyone else’s. But they aren’t recording losses, just earning less than they had. The demand for the Prius has outstripped their battery supplier’s ability to produce, at least in the short term, and they have been able to raise prices on it and other high-mileage models.

Honestly, my opinion is that they developed the hybrid more as a long term commitment to pushing “greener” transportation technology, and as a platform from which to develop other things. I don’t think anyone honestly saw the surge in fuel prices.

Nevertheless, I would contend that Toyota’s generally conservative approach and keeping their eye on the long term serves them better than trying to please the analysts. What we have here is simple: They bucked what the analysts were saying. GM did exactly what they were saying. GM put all of their proverbial eggs into the high-profit big trucks and SUV’s, and they don’t really have a Plan B right now.

More Short Term Thinking

When pickup sales dived, automakers changed plans – Yahoo News

A couple of interesting things about this article. The first is that there is no mention of the other major player in this market – Toyota. Maybe that is because, inexplicably, they manage to continue to make a profit, and are executing their plans.

Sure, their big truck sales have tanked. Last week a friend of mine went shopping for a mid-SUV and got such a good deal on a full size Tundra that he bought that instead. The dealers are looking to unload them. But the same dealer told him there is a 10 year plan to be #1 in trucks with a 15% market share. As an interesting sidebar, this long-time loyal Ford customer (he has an F-250) said “As soon as they make this in a diesel, I’ll buy it.”

But that isn’t the story here. The story is the difference between quarter-by-quarter thinking which catches leaders flat footed vs. having a 10 year plan. With a 10 year planning horizon, these are things which can be adjusted for. With a 3-12 month planning horizon, these are major disruptions that require changing everything.

The analogy – one strategy is looking at climate, and knowing that there will be storms, the other is looking only at tomorrow’s forecast and trying to cope.

Oh – and just to be sure everyone understands, the Toyota Tundra is not “imported” in spite of what the marketing people in Detroit want you to think.

Who’s Your Coach?

In a few weeks, the best athletes in the world will assemble in Beijing for the 2008 Summer Olympics. Just being there means these individuals are performing at a level that the rest of us can only watch and appreciate.

Each of these world-class top performers has a coach.

Ironically, their coaches are not capable of performing at the same level as the athletes themselves. If they could, they would be competing, not coaching.

To be sure, some of the coaches are former world-class athletes. But most of them are “just” world class coaches. They have the skill to watch the athlete perform, to compare what they observe against a standard of perfection and to see very subtle things which might make a difference in the athlete’s performance.

World class athletes all know they only perform at a world class level because they have world class coaches. It is the coach who takes them from “very good” to “Olympic contender.”

A coaches credibility is based on his ability to observe and teach. His success is built on the success of the people he coaches.

For business leaders:
Do you believe you can perform at a world-class level on your own?
Is your insight into your own performance good enough to pick up nuance and detail that could make a huge difference?
Do you believe that, because you have more experience, that no one below your level could teach you anything?
Do you believe that, because you have been successful, only someone who has had more personal success could teach you anything?
Do you measure “competence” by hierarchy level?

Who is your coach?