GM CEO Wagoner to step down at White House request

GM CEO Wagoner to step down at White House request

I find this news interesting on a lot of levels.

I have never worked at GM, and have never met Rick Wagoner. GM’s current problems have been a long time coming. They are not solely due to the current economic downturn, the market conditions have simply removed the veil.

GM has been steadily losing market share for a long time, while, in my opinion, clinging to the idea that somehow, someday, there would be a spontaneous triumphant return to the good old days. As someone else has said recently, “Hope is not a strategy.” GM has been institutionally unwilling to face harsh realities, and has fallen into the trap of “continuing to do the same things and expect a different outcome.”

Ironically, GM has had for a couple of decades, the best possible insight into their most successful competitor. No other automobile company has had the incredible advantage of unlimited access to a joint venture with Toyota. Everyone else has had to learn from books, consultants, or what they can glean from people they hire in. Not GM. And not just how to run it. They watched the entire process of converting the worst plant they had into the best. On that note alone, I am not sympathetic in any way to GM’s plight. They have just been very good at finding reasons why they couldn’t.

So, all in all, I agree that Wagoner’s time has past, he has had his chance, and he has failed the company.

But now what?

Personally, I think it is time for an outsider, possibly even someone from outside the automotive industry, to take charge. That is what Ford did, and though they are also hurting badly, they are moving in the right direction. The key qualification, in my mind, is someone willing to deal with the truth as it is, and capable of cleaning out the people who operate under any belief system other than “We are responsible.”

Another aspect of this story is disturbing, however. Wagoner’s departure is not at the request of the board of directors (though it should have been). No, it is at the request of the President of the United States. Now with the U.S. Treasury as a significant (and growing, apparently) stakeholder in GM, I suppose he can make that request. But this whole thing is, in my mind, dangerous territory.

The TPS In Four Words

ptolematic_universeIn the world of science, great discoveries simplify our understanding. When Copernicus hypothesized that everything in the universe does not revolve around the Earth, explaining the motions of things in the sky got a lot easier.

In general, I have found that if something requires a great deal of detail to explain the fundamentals, there is probably another layer of simplification possible.

Even today, a lot of authors explain “lean manufacturing” with terms like “a set of tools to reduce waste.” Then they set out trying to describe all of these tools and how they are used. This invariably results in a subset of what the Toyota Production System is all about.

Sometimes this serves authors or consultants who are trying to show how their process “fills in the gaps” – how their product or service covers something that Toyota has left out. If you think about that for a millisecond, it is ridiculous. Toyota is a huge, successful global company. They don’t “leave anything out.” They do everything necessary to run their business. Toyota’s management system, by default, includes everything they do. If we perceive there are “gaps” that must be filled, those gaps are in our understanding, not in the system.

So let me throw this out there for thought. The core of what makes Toyota successful can be expressed in four words:

Management By Hypothesis Testing

I am going to leave rigorous proof to the professional academics, and offer up anecdotal evidence to support my claim.

First, there is nothing new here. Let’s start with W. Edwards Deming.

Management is prediction.

What does Deming mean by that?

I think he means that the process of management is to say “If we do these things, in this way, we expect this result.” What follows is the understanding “If we get a result we didn’t expect, we need to dig in and understand what is happening.”

Control ChartAt its most basic level, the process of statistical process control does exactly that. The chart continuously asks and answers the question “Is this sample what we would expect from this process?” If the answer to that question is “No” then the “special cause” must be investigated and understood.

If the process itself is not “in control” then more must be learned about the process so that it can be made predictable. If there is no attempt to predict the outcome, most of the opportunity to manage and to learn is lost. The organization is just blindly reacting to events.

Here is another quote, attributed to Taiichi Ohno:

Without standards, there can be no kaizen.

Is he saying the same thing as Deming? I think so. To paraphrase, “Until you have established what you expect to do and what you expect to happen when you do it, you cannot improve.” The quote is usually brought up in the context of standard work, but that is a small piece of the concept.

So far all of these things relate to the shop floor, the details. What about the larger concepts?

What is a good business strategy? Is it not a defined method to achieve a desired result? “If we do these things, in this way, at these times, we should see this change in our business results.” The deployment of policy (hoshin planning) is, in turn, multiple layers of similar statements. And each of the hoshins, and the activities associated with them, are hypothesized to sum up to the whole.

The process of reflection (which most companies skip over) compares what was planned with what was actually done and achieved. It is intended to produce a deeper level of learning and understanding. In other words, reflection is the process of examining the experimental results and incorporating what was learned into the working theory of operation, which is then carried forward.

Sales and Operations Planning, when done well, carries the same structure. Given a sales and marketing strategy, given execution of that strategy, given the predicted market conditions, given our counters to competitor’s, we should sell these things at this time. This process carries the unfortunate term “forecasting” as though we are looking at the weather rather than influencing it, but when done well, it is proactive, and there is a deliberate and methodical effort to understand each departure from the original plan and assumptions.

Over Deming’s objections, “performance management” and reviews are a fact of life in today’s corporate environment. If done well, then this activity is not focused on “goals and objectives” but rather plans and outcomes, execution and adjustment. In other words, leadership by PDCA. By contrast, a poor “performance management system” is used to set (and sometimes even “cascade”) goals, but either blurs the distinction between “plans” (which are activities / time) and “goals” which are the intended results… or worse, doesn’t address plans at all. It gets even worse when there are substantial sums of money tied to “hitting the goals” as the organization slips into “management by measurement.” For some reason, when the goals are then achieved by methods which later turn out to be unacceptable, there is a big push on “ethics” but no one ever asks for the plan on “How do you plan to do that?” in advance. In short, when done well, the organization manages its plans and objectives using hypothesis testing. But most, sadly, do not.

Let’s look at another process in “people management” – finding and acquiring skills and talent, in other words, hiring.

In average companies, someone needing to hire someone puts in a “requisition” to Human Resources. HR, in turn, puts that req out into the market by various means. They get back applicants, screen them, and turn a few of them over to the hiring manager to assess. One of them gets hired.

What happens next?

The new guy is often dropped into the job, perhaps with minimal orientation on the administrative policies, etc. of the company, and there is a general expectation that this person is actually not capable of doing the work until some unspecified time has elapsed. Maybe there is a “probation period” but even that, while it may be well defined in terms of time, is rarely defined in terms of criteria beyond “Don’t screw anything up too badly.”

Contrast this with a world-class operation.

The desired outcome is a Team Member who is fully qualified to learn the detailed aspects of the specific job. He has the skills to build upon and need only learn the sequence of application. He has the requisite mental and physical condition to succeed in the work environment and the culture. In any company, any hiring manager would tell you, for sure, this is what they want. So why doesn’t HR deliver it? Because there is no hypothesis testing applied to the hiring process. Thus, the process can never learn except in the case of egregious error.

If we can agree that the above criteria define the “defect free outcome” of hiring, then the hiring process is not complete until this person is delivered to the hiring manager.

Think about the implications of this. It means that HR owns the process of development for the skills, and the mental and physical conditioning required of a successful Team Member. It means that when the Team Member reports to work in Operations, there is an evaluation, not of the person, but of the process of finding, hiring, and training the right person with the right skills and conditioning.

HR’s responsibility is to deliver a fully qualified candidate, not “do the best they can.” And if they can’t hire this person right off the street, then they must have a process to turn the “raw material” into fully qualified candidates. There is no blame, but there are no excuses.

Way back in 1944, the TWI programs applied this same thinking. The last question asked on the Job Relations Card is “Did you accomplish your objective?” The Job Instruction card ends with the famous statement “If the worker hasn’t learned, the teacher hasn’t taught.” In other words, the job breakdown, key points and instruction are a hypothesis: If we break down the job and emphasize these things in this way, the worker will learn it over the application of this method. If it didn’t work, take a look at your teaching process. What didn’t you understand about the work that was required for success?

I could go on, but I have yet to find any process found in any business that could not benefit from this basic premise. Where we fail is where we have:

  • Failed to be explicit about what we were trying to accomplish.
  • Failed to check if we actually accomplished it.
  • Failed to be explicit about what must be done to get there.
  • Did something, but are not sure if it is what we planned.
  • Accepted “problems” and deviation as “normal” rather than an inconsistency with our original thinking (often because there was no original thinking… no attempt to predict).

As countermeasures, when you look at any action or activity, contentiously ask a few questions.

  • What are we trying to get done?
  • How will we know we have done it?
  • What actions will lead to that result?
  • How will we know we have done them as we planned?

And

  • What did we actually do?
  • Why is there a difference between what we planned and what we did?
  • What did we actually accomplish?
  • Why is there a difference between what we expected and what we got?

The short version:

  • What did we expect to do and accomplish?
  • What did we do and get?
  • Why is there a difference?
  • What are we doing about it?
  • What have we learned?

Behind The Scenes Of An Outlier

Yesterday when I published Gipsie Ranney’s white paper “Remembering Nummi” I did so because I thought she made some points that others would be interested in.

Let me take you behind the scenes of WordPress. One of the things this little program makes available is a stats tracker. This is the graph of daily “Site Views” over the last month. I think the graph speaks for itself:

graph1Needless to say “Remembering Nummi” got some legs under it.

Looking at the graph, you can see that this site has a pretty steady pulse to it. The dips are weekends. The little (second highest) spike you see correlates with a link back from a site in Europe. Looking at this, and other information, I can reasonably conclude that I have a couple of dozen regular readers, probably from feeds, and the difference is click through traffic from other sites and search engine traffic.

Something different obviously was going on today.

I also see the regular sources of click-throughs to this site. This is a pretty typical list:

gembapantarei.com/2009/01/the_essenti…
leanblog.org
google.com/reader/view
leansupermarket.com/servlet/Page?temp…
google.ca
gembapantarei.com
gembapantarei.com/2009/01/finding_tim…
linkedin.com/mbox?displayMBoxItem=…
us.mc354.mail.yahoo.com/mc/showMessag…
search.conduit.com/Results.aspx?q=Typ…
170.2.59.38:15871/cgi-bin/afterWorkOp…
my.yahoo.com/p/3.html
translate.google.com.br/translate?hl=…

But here is today’s:

tmalive.tma.toyota.com/toyota/story.c…
dailynews.tma.toyota.com/story.cfm?st…
clipsheet.ford.com/article_view.cfm?a…
clipsheet.ford.com/article_view.cfm?a…
dailynews.tma.toyota.com
clipsheet.ford.com/article_view.cfm?a…
toyota.lonebuffalo.com/story.cfm?stor…
global.clipsheet.ford.com/article_vie…
tmalive.tma.toyota.com/toyota
global.clipsheet.ford.com/article_vie…
dailynews.toyota.com/story.cfm?story_…

So I conclude that “Remembering NUMMI” got picked up by a couple of news clipping services and fed into Toyota and Ford.

First, then, is a “Welcome” to any new readers from these great companies. Please feel free to peruse, comment, and even offer to write a guest post.

Though I cannot attribute to anything other than who does, or does not, subscribe to a particular clipping service, I did find it ironic that this article, really taking a critical look at the need for government guaranteed “bailout” loans to the automotive industry, was read exclusively by people in two companies who (so far) have not asked for any help. (I speak primarily of Ford here – they conspicuously said “We can get by for right now, thank you.

To this I offer a personal comment – as a former Boeing employee I have met (though certainly did not know) Alan Mullaly (now CEO of Ford). While no leader is perfect, I believe he is certainly capable of helping the Ford culture to “confront the brutal facts” of their business. My main question about Ford is whether they had already hit the iceberg when they brought him on board.

To GM and Chrysler, though, I guess I would offer: Gipsie Ranney seems to be talking to you guys. It would behoove you to listen to her. Yes there are devestating external factors at work, but guys… your boat was leaking faster than the bilge pumps were pumping long before the storm. Stop blaming the weather and take a look inside. That is where your issues are.

Toyota projects first operating loss since 1941

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20081222/ap_on_bi_ge/as_japan_toyota

At one level, this news drives home the state of the global economy. But let’s parse the story a bit and see if there is contrast about how Toyota handles this vs. how their competitors do.

First, of course, is the “…since 1941” part, compared to the record losses that have been reported by the rest of the sector for many quarters now. This is the first time the leadership has had to report a loss.

Gloom dominated the annual news conference by Toyota’s president, who in recent years had outlined ambitious expansion plans. This year, Toyota President Katsuaki Watanabe even refused to give a worldwide vehicle sales goal for 2009.

“The tough times are hitting us far faster, wider and deeper than expected,” he told reporters at Toyota’s Nagoya office. “This is an unprecedented crisis requiring urgent action.” [emphasis added]

So what will they do about it?

Watanabe vowed Toyota would grow so lean it would realize profitability even if its worldwide sales slid to as low as 7 million vehicles  — what he called the basic “bottom line” for Toyota.

“We must change to become more slim, muscular and flexible,” he said.

While I am certainly not inside anyone’s board room, here is what I am reading between the lines.

In Lansing (GM), the attitude is that external forces are causing an otherwise well managed company to suffer hard times. “We can’t do anything about this, it’s not our fault.”

In Nagoya (Toyota) the attitude is  “If we had managed well enough, this would not have happened. We need to examine ourselves and do something about this so it doesn’t happen again.”

Of course the whole mess is fraught with U.S. politics which will complicate things immensely. But it will still be interesting to watch.

Oh – and, while they are certainly in trouble, I believe our friends in Dearborn (Ford) got off the denial train a while ago. Time will tell if it was soon enough for them.

Toyota Profit Slips 28% as Truck Sales Fall

Toyota Profit Slips 28% as Truck Sales Fall – NYTimes.com

This story in yesterday’s online New York Times has a couple of interesting points.

Toyota said its net income fell to 353.7 billion yen ($3.2 billion), in the quarter, compared with 491.5 billion yen in the period a year earlier.

So they, like everyone else, are being hurt by the plunge in big truck sales.

But note that their profits are down. This is different from their losses are up.

their overall results were hardly comparable to the $15.5 billion loss reported by General Motors and the $8.7 billion loss by the Ford Motor Company

Just as a "check" of the financial results, let’s look at market share:

The automaker improved its market share in the United States to 17.4 percent in the quarter, even as its sales volumes declined.

So, yes, their sales are down, but they are down less than everyone else’s.

Now, to be clear, Toyota has issues. Who doesn’t? But, year on year, their management system is delivering the thing that is most important to them: Consistency.

Queue Management

Although my experience of late has been with a particular “red tail” airline (soon, I hear to be part of the “triangle” airline..), this applies to any service counter.

I fly a lot. As such, I find myself in front of the Sea-Tac airline counter a lot. So much that I recognize most of the people working there. Not so much that they recognize me, but then, I haven’t made a pain of myself either.

Because I fly a lot, I have accumulated the privilege of checking in with the first and business class folks, even if I am in one of the cheap seats, rather than dealing with the little kiosks then waiting for my luggage tag to print out somewhere and hoping that, in the chaos, my luggage tag actually ends up on my luggage. (Another story.. but, take my advice – learn the airport code of where you are going and physically check before your bag goes down the conveyor!)

Anyway, twice in a row now I have been waiting patiently as the single person who is supposed to be providing personal service to the best customers is dealing for a dozen+ minutes trying to re-ticket someone who has had a problem.

I certainly sympathize with the people being re-ticketed, been there, done that, but the question I have is this: Do they really intend for all processing of their very best customers to grind to a halt when this happens?

I would imagine that, if you asked the question of an executive somewhere, the answer would be “Of course not.” But then again, I would also imagine that their corporate executives don’t have to wait in line – even with the very best customers – to check in to their flights, so they never actually experience what their customers do.

Here is how you keep things moving in an administrative process:

  • Set a takt time – the standard time that should be suffecient to process a normal transaction.
  • Keep track of actual time.
  • When actual time hits some alarm threshold – which you get to set, perhaps 110% of takt, then trigger some kind of andon. You have an exception. Processing is now not normal.
  • When this happens, in order to maintain throughput, the exception must be processed as an exception, and the routine should resume its normal pace.

This is how you beat Goldratt’s marching Boy Scouts problem. It is also how you demonstrate to your customers that you understand the very basics of managing queues.

Interesting sidebar – the customer surveys that are available on board the aircraft don’t ask anything about the experience prior to getting into your seat.

Sidebar #2: Today we pulled away from the gate, then went to a parking space and sat for half an hour with the engines shut down. The pilot explained that there was a weather system out there, and air traffic control was increasing spacing. Even though this information was (likely) known prior to boarding, the measurement of “on time” is “pull away from the gate” not “leave the ground” so in order to get an “on time” departure, they will load the plane as scheduled, then go sit on the tarmac rather than delaying the passenger load. A great example of “management by measurement” not getting exactly the intended results.

More Short Term Thinking

When pickup sales dived, automakers changed plans – Yahoo News

A couple of interesting things about this article. The first is that there is no mention of the other major player in this market – Toyota. Maybe that is because, inexplicably, they manage to continue to make a profit, and are executing their plans.

Sure, their big truck sales have tanked. Last week a friend of mine went shopping for a mid-SUV and got such a good deal on a full size Tundra that he bought that instead. The dealers are looking to unload them. But the same dealer told him there is a 10 year plan to be #1 in trucks with a 15% market share. As an interesting sidebar, this long-time loyal Ford customer (he has an F-250) said “As soon as they make this in a diesel, I’ll buy it.”

But that isn’t the story here. The story is the difference between quarter-by-quarter thinking which catches leaders flat footed vs. having a 10 year plan. With a 10 year planning horizon, these are things which can be adjusted for. With a 3-12 month planning horizon, these are major disruptions that require changing everything.

The analogy – one strategy is looking at climate, and knowing that there will be storms, the other is looking only at tomorrow’s forecast and trying to cope.

Oh – and just to be sure everyone understands, the Toyota Tundra is not “imported” in spite of what the marketing people in Detroit want you to think.

Keep it Simple

We have created an entire generation (or two) of managers who are very savvy with cost accounting models. They know exactly how “costs” and “profits” are calculated, and they know exactly what inputs to manipulate in order to make the numbers as good as possible.

They know, for example, how “inventory turns” are calculated, that “average inventory” is determined by end-of-quarter snapshots, and how to turn off production and pull in next quarter’s sales to starve the system for a week. Of course, anybody can also claim reduced oxygen consumption by holding his breath when it is being checked.

I put the terms “costs” and “profits” in quotes because one of the features characteristics problems(?) with modern cost accounting is that the models are complex. They are that way, not because costs are complex, they aren’t. They are that way because reporting is complex. They are that way because managers want to be secure in a fantasy that they can have a unit cost for every unit of production. “This product cost $4.72 to produce.” And once they have that number, they can calculate margins, forecast profits.

Here is the rub: That $4.72 cost figure is the result of a process that answers “What is 1+1?” with the statement: “It depends on your assumptions.” And by the time the PowerPoint Rangers are done with the summary, those assumptions are long buried and forgotten.

That unit cost figure is valid only for a certain level of production, because it includes allocation of costs that do not change as production levels change. Other costs that do change, change in non-linear ways.

There are lots of way to allocate fixed costs. Depending on which one you use (especially in multi-product operations), can completely alter the profit / loss numbers for a particular product.

So, while all of this cost accounting stuff is necessary to report taxes, and to report to the shareholders analysts, we forget that it is just a model. Aside from the top line (total sales) and the bottom line (the actual money we can keep), everything else is just someone’s representation of where the money actually went.

Here is my admittedly simplistic take.

A manufacturing company makes profit by adding value at a higher rate than they incur costs.
The value they add is the difference between what they pay for the parts and raw materials that are transformed into the final product, and the actual, real, cash-across-the-table revenue they get for the product when it is actually sold to a real customer who does not work for the same company. (This has nothing to do with internal transfer pricing, etc. because that is all just shuffling things from one column to another for the benefit of the cost accounting model. Until you actually cash the customer’s check, you have not sold the product.)

Since the idea of “unit cost” is really an artifact of whatever particular cost allocation you choose to use, then the idea of “unit margin” is equally dubious.

When I ask the finance folks to tell me how many units I need to sell to break even, they start by calculating a margin, then dividing the cost of operation by that margin, and presto!, break even.

Bzzzzt. The rub is that the margin per unit is only an estimate until the period is over, total costs are added up, and total margin is allocated across production. To use estimated margin to determine a break-even sales level is a circular reference.

But I can calculate how much value is added to each unit. [What can sell it for] – [What I pay for the pieces].

My break even is even simpler. Assuming that 100% of the value-add is allocated against the cost of running the factory (Total monthly payroll, total utilities, total everything except what I paid for what I will sell), until 100% of those costs are covered. With luck and good management, that happens before the end of the period. The total value add of the next unit is profit. And the total value add of every other unit after that is profit. This holds true whether you do it for a hour, a day, a week, a month, a year.

Now I can take projected sales, and determine, at any given rate of production (which drives a lot of the fixed costs), when I break even, and how much profit I can expect. Isn’t that what we are after anyway?

Why does everyone make it so complicated?

And yes, I know it is more complicated than this, but it isn’t THAT much more complicated.