Category: Quality

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Systematic Problem Solving

If I were to look at the experience of the organization profiled in the last three posts “A Systematic Approach to Part Shortages” I believe their biggest breakthrough was cultural. By applying the “morning market” as a process of managing problems, they began a shift from a reactive organization to a problem solving culture.

I can cite two other data points which suggest that when an organization starts managing problem solving in a systematic way, their performance begins to steadily improve. Even managing problem solving a little bit better results in much more consistent improvement and less backsliding. Of course my personal experience is only anecdotal. That is certainly true by the time you read it here as I try to filter things. But consider this: The key difference with Toyota’s approach that Steven Spear pointed out in “Decoding the DNA of the Toyota Production System” (as well as his PhD dissertation) was that the application of rules of flow triggered problem solving activity whenever there was a gap between expected and actual process or expected and actual outcome.

Does this mean you should go out and implement morning market’s everywhere? Again, based on my single company data point, no. That doesn’t work any more than attaching kanban cards to all of your parts and calling it a pull system. It is not about the white boards, it is not even about reviewing the problems every day. Reactive organizations do that too. In most cases in the Big Company that implemented morning markets everywhere, that is what happened – they morphed into another format for the Same Old Stuff.

Here are some of the things my example organization did that I think contributed to success in their cultural shift.

  • They separated “containment” and “countermeasure” as two separate and distinct responses. This was to make sure that they all understood “containment” is what is done immediately to re-start production while preserving safety and quality. “Containment” was not a countermeasure as it rarely (if ever) actually addressed the root cause. It only isolated the effect of the problem as far upstream as possible. The rule of thumb was simple:
    • Containment nearly always adds time, cost, resources, etc.
    • A true countermeasure nearly always removes not only the containment, but reduces time, cost, resources.
  • They didn’t use the meetings to discuss solutions. They only addressed two things:
    • A quick update on the status of ongoing problem solving.
    • A quick overview of new problems from yesterday.

I think this is an important point because too many meetings get bogged down with people talking about problems, and speculating what the causes are. That is completely non-productive.

  • The actual people working on problems attended the meeting. I cannot over-emphasize how important this is. They did not send a single representative. Each person with expected activity reported his or her progress over the last 24 hours. It is difficult to stand in front of a group and say “I didn’t do anything.”
  • They blocked out time to work on problems. I probably should have put this one first. The manufacturing engineers and other professional problem solvers agreed not to schedule anything else for at least two hours every morning. This time was dedicated to working on the shop floor to understand the problem, and physically experiment with solutions. There was a lot of resistance to this. But over a couple of months it became close to the norm. It helped a lot because it started to drive the group to consider where they really spent their time vs. what they needed to get done. There was no doubt in the past that solving these problems was important, but it was never urgent. Nobody was ever asked why they weren’t working on a shop floor issue. That had been a “when I am done with everything else activity.” Gradually the group developed a stronger sense of the shop floor as their customer.
  • They didn’t assign problems until someone was available to work on them. This came a little later, when the problem-solvers were missing deadlines. The practice had been to assign a responsible person in the morning when the problem was first reviewed. Realistically a person can work on one problem a time, and perhaps work on another when waiting for something. They established a priority list. The priority was set primarily by manufacturing. When a problem-solver became available, the next item on the list was assigned. Once a problem was assigned, nothing would over-ride that assignment except a safety issue or a defect that had actually escaped the plant and reached a customer.
  • They got everyone formal training on problem solving with heavy emphasis on true root cause. People were expected to follow the method.
  • A problem was not cleared from the board until a long term countermeasure had been implemented and verified as working.

By blocking out time, they were able to establish some kind of expectation for productivity. After that, if problems were accumulating faster than they were being cleared, they knew they had a methods or resource issue. The same was true for their other tasks which were worked on during the rest of the day.

This was the start of establishing a form of standard work for the problem solvers.

21 Oct 08 – There is more on the subject here and here

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A Systematic Approach to Part Shortages – Part 3

The third element of this organization’s successful drive to eliminate part shortages was a systematic approach to problem solving. They made it a process, managed just like any other process, rather than something people did when they had time. Even though this is “Part 3” of this series, in reality they put this into place at the same time, and actually a little ahead, of kanban and leveling.

The Morning Market

The idea of the “morning market” came from a chapter in Imai’s book “Gemba Kaizen.” He describes a process where the previous day’s defects are physically set out on a table and reviewed first thing in the morning – “while they are fresh” hence the analogy to the morning markets.

This organization had been trying to practice the concept of a morning market for a few weeks, and was beginning to get it into an actual process. Because supplier problems constituted a major cause of disruption, they set up a separate morning market for defective purchased parts.

That process branched yet again into a morning market for part shortages. And this evolved into a bit of a mental breakthrough.

They started looking at process defects.

Every shortage, every day, was recorded on the board.

Each morning the previous day’s shortages were reviewed. They were grouped into three categories based on knowledge of the cause – just like outlined in the book.

  • “A” problems – they knew the cause, knew the countermeasure, but had some excuse reason why it could not be implemented right away.
  • “B” problems – they knew the cause, but did not have a good countermeasure yet.
  • “C” problems – knew the symptom (parts weren’t there) but didn’t know why.

The mental breakthrough was systematically investigating the reason each and every shortage occurred. What they found was that in the vast majority of cases it was an internal process breakdown, rather than some problem at the supplier, that caused the shortage. This was a bit of a revelation.

They began systematically fixing their processes, one problem at a time.

Over time things got better. Simultaneously they were implementing the kanban system. Kanban comes with its own set of possible problems, like cards getting lost. Once again, when they found problems they went into the morning market and were systematically addressed.

After a few months into their kanban implementation, for example, they started turning in card audits with far less than 2% irregularities, and then it was not unusual for a card audit to find no problems at all. Why? They had addressed the reasons why cards end up somewhere other than where they should be. Instead of blaming people, they looked for why people acting in good faith would not follow the process.

This was also an attitude shift – assume a flaw in the process itself, or in communication, before looking for “who did it.”

Eventually the warehouse team had their own morning market. As did the receiving team. As did the parts picking team. As did assembly. Each looked at any case where they were not able to deliver exactly what their downstream customer needed.

About 8 months into this, another group in an adjacent building, was trying to work through their own issues. They came over for a tour. One of the supervisors, visibly shaken, came to me and said

“Now I get it. These people work together in a fundamentally different way.”

And they did. They worked as a team, focusing on the problems, not on each other.

And that, readers, is the goal of “lean manufacturing.” If you aren’t working toward that, then you aren’t really implementing anything.

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A Systematic Approach to Part Shortages – Part 2

For kanban to work well, there has to be a solid foundation under it. That foundation is production leveling or heijunka.

Before I get to far into this, though, I would like to point something out: At the mention of leveling, people who are only just learning about kanban will point out all of the good reasons why leveling is difficult. Here is a key point: The problems caused by running kanban without good leveling pale in comparison to the total chaos that ensues if you try to run MRP without leveling. I’ll stay out of that little rabbit hole until another day though.

Production leveling has two parts.

  1. Leveling the production volume.
  2. Leveling the production mix.

The operation I described in Part 1 was relatively small, so it was a simple matter to set up a totally manual system to do this. By small I mean they had two major assembly lines running at a rates on the order of 10 units / day. The product was about the size and complexity of a medium to large-sized photocopier (though not a photocopier). The assembly lines had about half a dozen positions each. There were several hundred parts from about as many suppliers. (Different story.)

The objective in leveling volume is for the production line to see demand as an image of the takt time, and to protect that signal from variation in actual orders and shipping. At the same time, the shipping dock was to see deliveries to the finished goods buffer at takt time, regardless of minor and medium problems in production.

To accomplish this they separated the “big lump” of inventory that typically existed in shipping into two physically separate buffers.

The Withdrawal Loop

Customers, unfortunately, rarely order at takt time. The purpose of the buffer in shipping was to absorb this variation and make the actual demand appear as if it arrived exactly at takt. The organization also tried to take out some of the bigger spikes in customer orders by working with dealers to get more transparency into actual customer order patterns; as well as trying to level actual promise-to-ship dates at least weekly if they couldn’t get it to daily. That helped a lot. A more sophisticated order entry system would have worked better, but that luxury wasn’t in place yet.

Back to the buffers. Each unit in shipping had a withdrawal kanban card attached to it. As orders were released, a unit would be pulled from this buffer and shipped. The withdrawal card went back to the production control department. Those cards were placed in the inventory management box. This box had series of slots that indicated authorized inventory levels. A card in one of the slots indicated inventory we didn’t have, an empty slot indicated inventory on-hand.

There were limit markers at near each end of the row of slots. As long a the end of the row of cards stayed between those limit markers, everything was regarded as OK. They did not try to chase a particular level of inventory with production.

The scheduled production rate was 10 units / day.

Each morning Production Control would take 10 cards from their box and put them into the leveling box in shipping. That box had slots that corresponded to times of day. The cards were evenly distributed at the takt-time interval. As that time came up, shipping would take the withdrawal card from the box, go to the end of the production line, attach their card to a unit, and move it to the shipping buffer.

This seemed like a lot of trouble, but it served a purpose. It was to hide the irregularities of shipping schedules and actual order dates from assembly. They saw a clean, paced signal exactly at takt time. The process was designed so that assembly saw a perfect customer, even if the customers were far from perfect.

If management didn’t like the size of the shipping buffer, they knew exactly what problem(s) must be solved to reduce it – they needed to improve the dealer ordering and management processes so dealers would stop using deep reorder points and ordering weeks worth of product at once.

The Production Loop

When units were withdrawn from the end of the line, they were actual pulled from a FIFO buffer. In this case, the buffer held about 4 hours of production. Why? Most problems in production were cleared within that time. Only a bigger problem would starve the buffer and affect the withdrawal loop. Thus the purpose of this buffer was to make assembly appear as a perfect supplier to their perfect customer. They could supply exactly at the agreed-upon takt time.

Each of these units had a production kanban card attached to it. When shipping came to pull a unit, they would pull the production card and leave it in a kanban post. They would attach their withdrawal card and take the unit. Thus switching the cards transfers ownership of the product from one loop to the next. Since a kanban card authorizes a specific quantity to be in a specific location, if someone wants to take something somewhere else they need to attach a card authorizing them to do so. That was the case here.

The production cards went to the front of the assembly line. There were three slots there. One green, one yellow, one red. If everything was running smoothly, the card would go into the green slot, and when the next unit was started, the card would be pulled from the box and attached to the unit.

If the line were a little bit behind, there might still be a card in the green slot. Then the next card would go into the yellow slot. This would automatically signal the assembly manager that there was something that needed some attention.

The next card would end up in the red slot. This was the point when, if they weren’t already there for a known problem, they were in “line stop” mode. Anyone who could be helping to clear the problem should be helping to clear the problem. Why? The money machine has stopped running. Everyone is now being paid only because the shareholders are lending them money. The idea is to get the money machine running as quickly as possible, and it is the most important thing. This was a simple phased escalation process, and was part of their overall andon / escalation system.

Did it work?

All I can say is that it worked a hell of a lot better than what they were doing before. It took two or three serious tries to get this into place and keep it working, and they probably fell off the wagon a couple of times after that. There were always immense pressures to “reduce inventory” at the end of the quarter, for example, which would have management directing to starve out the shipping buffer, or push it out early. But, in general, when it was working, overtime was lower, things were more predictable, problems were identified very quickly.

But…

Yes, it looks like a lot of manual work involved. But I want to be really clear – the total time spent moving all of these cards around was a fraction of the time that had previously been spent investigating status, working action messages, making calls to find out what was happening, etc, etc. For some reason people seem to think that deliberate activities raise the total amount of labor involved, and that somehow, the time spent running after information and chasing problems is free.

Setting a standard and following it injects an element of stability and calm into an otherwise chaotic workplace. Once this basic foundation is in place it is far easier to improve overall efficiency because now there is an actual process to improve.

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Toyota Museum Display: Universal Design

One of the displays in the Toyota Museum in Nagoya was an exhibition on “Universal Design.” This exhibition runs through December 2.

Rather than trying to interpret and articulate the concepts, I just want to list some of the key words. I think they stand for themselves, and provide a good baseline for evaluating the design of anything which must interact with humans.

  • Easy to see
  • Easy to hear
  • Easy to use
  • Easy to understand
  • You don’t have to be strong
  • Comfortable posture
  • OK for almost everyone
  • Equitable use
  • Flexible in use
  • Simple and intuitive
  • Perceptible information
  • Tolerance for error
  • Low physical effort
  • Size and space for approach and use

The exhibition highlights design concepts and features that make products (particularly automobiles, obviously) .

They talk about the physiological value of the product, in addition to the physical value. This is the linkage between the things which provide physical comfort and accessibility through the things which provide “comfort and peace of mind” – the things which assure the user (driver) that things are OK.

Things which people must see include special attention to the view through aging eyes. I can personally attest that things look different through the eyes of a 50+ year old than they do to a 20 year old. Contrast is reduced, as is resolution. Choices of fonts, sizes, colors are more important.

Even outside of automotive, if you are designing anything which needs humans to pay attention and interpret information, it is important to apply a little thinking into what they (humans) actually see, and what sorts of things penetrate consciousness and get the attention of someone who isn’t that attentive right now.

This carries back to the concepts I outlined in an earlier post “Sticky Visual Controls.” Of course a “visual control” is (or should be) also audible if you want someone who is otherwise distracted (or looking in another direction) to see it.

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Shingijutsu Kaizen Seminar Day 5 – Toyota Museum, Toyota Tour

Friday was a visit to the Toyota Museum in the morning and the “1 hour tour” of the Tsutsumi assembly plant in the afternoon.

Toyota Museum

If you ever get to Nagoya, the Toyota Museum is superb and definitely worth a visit. Even if you have no interest at all in lean manufacturing (so why are you reading this??) you get a really good look at over 100 years of technology development in the weaving industry, as well as their automotive history.

Sakichi Toyoda was one of Japan’s greatest inventors. Starting at the end of the 19th century he started incorporating mechanical assist and then automation into weaving looms. Remarkably his inventions were the first significant advance in weaving technology since John Kay invented the flying shuttle in 1733. Most of Sakichi’s principles remain today. There have been engineering advancements, but the basics are all still there. It was patent licensing of his first fully-automated loom with auto shut-off (jidoka) — the Model G in 1924 — that capitalized his start into the automobile business.

But I have to give credit to Gregg, one of my team-mates here, who summed it all up in one profound sentence:

“… all of this started with a son trying to make life easier for his mother.”

Wow. and Yeah. That insight really got to the core of what kaizen is about – a passion for making the work easier, because people’s burden matters.

Tsutsumi Plant Tour

Just to be clear, this is exactly the same tour that any group gets. There is nothing particularly special. The bus is boarded at the gate by the Public Relations girl (they are always young women), and she starts the spiel. We are on the catwalk over the line following a specific route.

So what did I see?

Wow. And that is not just because it was a Toyota plant, been on this tour before. The “Wow” is that they have made a significant change in their material conveyance. This may be old news to you, but I was last in this plant in 2000, so it was new to me. Previously they had line side racks with stocks of parts for the various models and options. The assembler looked at the manifest for the part code, and picked the appropriate parts for that car from the bins and installed them.

Later on I know they placed RFID on the car roofs which tell the various poka-yokes in the work station what the car needs, but the pick method was not fundamentally different. Kanban replenished the parts are they were used. (more about the RFID in a little bit.)

Now they are kitting car-specific collections of parts and sequencing them to the assembly stations. This is significant because I am a big fan of picking kits and delivering them to assembly at takt. There are a lot of possible problems which are mitigated or eliminated when this is done. But I had always conceded that at some point, takt time was so quick that it might not be practical.

I stand corrected. Here is an operation picking and delivering kits to many hundreds of assembly positions, one-by-one, at a takt of just under 60 seconds. Wow. The picking process is, well, superb, I am not sure what else I can say about it here. I am going to assemble my thoughts over the next couple of days.

RFID – the Car as Customer

The other really interesting bit was the use of an RFID box on top of every car. The box has that particular car’s configuration and options coded in it. (I suppose it could be a serial number linked to an option list in a data base too, but knowing some basic tenants of Toyota’s philosophy regarding information flow, I would not be surprised if the data were actually carried on the car.)

As the car moves through the processes, each work station basically asks the car “What are you? What do you need?” and the “car” responds through the RFID. The work stations’ poka-yokes and other configuration dependent things then adjust to help the assembler give the car what it needs.

So why not just put the sequence list in the computer and have each one called up as it goes by?

What happens if (inevitably) some small variation causes the list to not be accurate. There are thousands of things that can cause small changes. The second that computer sequence list is inaccurate, the entire system breaks down. And inaccurate it will be. Anyone who has tried to run their factory on detailed MRP blowdown knows what I am talking about.

No, in this case, each car “pulls” the work it requires, when it requires it. The information in each work station is delivered just-in-time, and not one second earlier. Thus the information is always the latest. Note that this is really not a fundamental change philosophically. The car has always carried its configuration information with it on the paper manifest. What is different here is that the computer system is facilitating better kaizen, but the information flow philosophy has not changed. The information travels with the car, not ahead of it.

What about that picking and kitting process? Well – and maybe one of you Toyota guys out there can answer this for me – and I will update this accordingly – but I would speculate that it too is driven by the RFID tags rather than a production sequence list. It is a very simple matter to know how many takt-times of lead time are required to pick the kit and get it to the appropriate station. (Well, it is simple for Toyota who is so takt-pulse driven, it may not be as simple for the rest of us – a kaizen opportunity here – basic stability.)

If it takes 10 takt times to pick and get a kit to the line, then 10 positions upstream of the delivery point the RFID is queried. “What are you?” That tells the system what is needed in +10 positions, and the pick list is sent to the picking area. The parts are pulled, kanban cards posted for replenishment, and the kit-cart sent on its way.. first in, first out, one-by-one to the assembly line.

No calculated lead-time offset. No sequenced pick list created in the morning. No sequenced pick list that will be wrong 5 minutes after it is printed. Robust, problem-tolerant, and simple.

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Getting Leaders Involved

“How do I get the leaders involved?” How often have we all heard, or even asked, that question? Of course the actual answer is “you can’t.” At least you can’t force them to. But there are things that might help the leader decide to get involved.

I think the biggest mistake people make is to assume that in the face of adequate logical argument, a right-thinking leader will see the benefits and jump right in. This thinking ignores one simple truth: Leaders are human. Humans, in spite of our desire to believe otherwise, make decisions at an emotional level, and then construct a logical argument to support the decision. Actually we construct illogical arguments, carefully shaping, amplifying, demoting, excluding evidence to rationalize what we want to do. We humans would all like to believe (or would like other humans to believe) that our decisions are logical and rational. Sorry, just ’tain’t so. Advertisers and marketers know this, as do good politicians.

Another big mistake is to think it is possible to use measures to “make” them engage. “If only,” it is thought, “we used the right metrics.” Again, sorry. You can’t measure people into behaving a certain way. An even worse approach is to try to measure “lean implementation” as if you can quantify it by looking at what tools are in use. That, at best, drives the wrong behavior with shallow understanding. At worst, it poisons the entire implementation. Counting kaizen events falls into this category, as does demanding central reporting on them.

True leaders do what they believe are the right things, metrics be damned. And the ones who focus all of their decisions on making the metrics look good are not the people you want to have that kind of responsibility.

So what does work?

Let’s go back and think through what we want here.

Consider this: We emphasize full involvement and participation from the people who carry out the production processes, but we don’t demand the same level of participation from the people who carry out the management process.

So what do we do to get the production people fully participating? I can’t speak for anyone else, but what I have found that works is to give them the opportunity to step back and just watch the process and understand what is actually happening.

Remember, there are no guarantees. Nothing is a sure bet. But if you buy the argument that a purely logical argument probably isn’t going to do it, then you need to look at how to make an emotional impact.

I think the key is to help them see one important thing: Most of the things which disrupt people’s work are small. They are small problems, and each one has a small impact. It is the cumulative impact of these issues which overwhelm the traditional response system.

But those small things are also wonderful because almost anyone with a little time, a little smarts, and a little leadership support can come up with countermeasures that make those problems go away. Since “smarts” is pretty much randomly distributed in the organization (meaning no one has a monopoly on it by virtue of position), it is the other two ingredients which leadership must provide.

The classic “kaizen event” is a wonderful way to teach just what this is about. In fact, that was the original intention of the classic “kaizen event.” I have already talked about that. But you don’t need a formal kaizen event to do this, you just need you and a leader willing to humor you.

Take your leader down to the work area. Stand with him “in the chalk circle” and give him a running commentary of what you see. Call out everything that isn’t value-add, and get him thinking why that activity is necessary. Then go fix something. The two of you, together. Go get the cardboard, the bins. Go propose a couple of solutions to the affected worker(s). Going to them with something concrete to bounce from is a more effective way (in the beginning) to get their input than asking them a totally open-ended “What do you want here?” question.

Try a few things, make an improvement.

Then make another. Then another.

Work at this for as long as you can get away with it.

Then ask your leader to do the same thing you just did with him, only do it with his direct report(s). At that point, try to shift your role to that of a facilitator and adviser.

If you succeed, you leader catches kaizen fever.

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What Nukes – a little more clear.

I re-read my “What Nukes?” post and realized I was really rambling. I want to reiterate a key point more clearly because I think it is important.

In the “Bad Apple” theory there is an implied assumption that the cause of an accident or other problem was one person who, at that moment in time, was not following the documented rules or procedures.

Except in the most egregious cases, such as deliberate misconduct, that is likely not the case. Most organizations have a set of “norms” that operate at some level of violation of the written or established procedures. The reasons for this are many, but usually it is because good people are doing the best they can, in the conditions they are given, to get the job done.

Failure to follow the rules does not result in an accident or incident.

Have you every run a red light or a stop sign? It happens thousands of times every day. It almost never results in an accident. Only when other contributing conditions are ripe will an accident result. Running a stop sign AND a car coming through the intersection.

The same goes for quality checks, and the more reliable an “almost 100%” process becomes, the more vulnerable you are. If a defect is only rarely produced, it is unlikely that any kind of human-based inspection will catch it. The faster the work cycle, the more this is true. The mind numbs, it is impossible to always pay attention to the detail, and the mind sees what it expects. “Failure to pay attention” is never an adequate root cause. It is blaming an unlucky Team Member for an omission that everyone makes every day just going through life. It is just, in this case, “there was a car coming through the intersection.” It is bad luck. It is being blamed for red beads in Deming’s paddle experiment.

So attaching the failure of an individual, while it is easy, avoids the core issue:

People’s failure in critical processes is a SYSTEM PROBLEM. You must investigate from the viewpoint of the person at the pointy end. What did he see? What did he perceive? What did he believe was happening and why was that belief reasonable given his interpretation of the circumstances at the time.

The post about “sticky visual controls” got to this. Your mistake-alerts or problem signals must penetrate conciousness and demand attention if they do not actually shut down the process.

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Waste

I guess four months into this, it kind of makes sense to talk about waste. But rather than repeat what everyone else says, maybe I can contribute to the dialog and toss out some things to think about.

Identifying / Seeing Waste.

Taiichi Ohno had 7 wastes, a few publications say 7+1. I have always disliked trying to put “types of waste” into buckets. I have seen long discussions, some of them fairly heated, about which list of wastes is “correct” and whether this waste or that waste should be included, or whether it is included in another one. None of this passes the “So What?” test. (A related military acronym is DILLIGAS, but I’ll leave it as an exercise for the reader to work out what it means.)

The problem, as I see it, with lists of categories isn’t the categories themselves. It is that we teach people using the categories. We make people memorize the categories. We create clever mnemonics like TIMWOOD and CLOSEDMITT. We send them on waste safari with cameras to collect “examples” of various types of waste. Well.. you can’t take a photo of overproduction because it is a verb. You can only photograph the result – excess inventory. So which is it? People end up in theological discussions that serve no purpose.

Like I mentioned in an earlier post, teach it by inverting the problem. The thing people need to understand is this: Anything that is not adding value is waste. If you understand what value is, then waste is easy to see. It is anything else. What category of waste is that? Who cares. That only matters when you are working on a countermeasure.

What about “necessary waste?” Even Ohno concedes there is some of that. OK – ask “does this work directly enable a task that does add value?” Then it is probably necessary – for now.

Let’s take a real-world example from my little corner of the world – welding. Welding is pretty easy. If there is an arc, it is very likely value is being added. Not always, but it is a good place to start. Now – watch a welder. What does he do when he is not “burning wire?” (the phrase “and producing a quality weld” has to be tacked onto the end of this because I can burn wire, but it doesn’t mean I am welding.)

What stops the welder from welding? When, and why, does he have to put down the gun and do something else? For that matter, what makes him let go of the trigger and stop the arc? Is he loading parts into the jig? Does he have to jiggle those parts into place? Does he have to adjust the jig?

Special Types of Waste

In spite of what I said above, there are two types of waste that merit special attention. Most everyone who can spell “J-I-T” knows that overproduction is one of them. I won’t go into it here – anyone who is reading this probably already gets that at some level. If I am wrong about that, leave a comment and I’ll expand.

The other is the “waste of waiting.” Of all of the categories, overproduction is clearly the worst, but the waste of waiting is the best. Why?

It is the only type of waste that can be translated directly into productivity. It is the waste you are creating as you are using kaizen to remove the others. That is because all of your kaizen is focused on saving time and time savings, in the short term, turn busy people into idle people.

Let me cite some examples:

  • The Team Member is overproducing. You put in a control mechanism to stop it. Now the team member must wait for the signal or work cycle to start again before resuming work.
  • You remove excess conveyance by moving operations closer together. The person doing the conveyance now has less to do. He is idle part of the time where he was busy.
  • Defects and rework – eliminate those and there is less to do. More idle people.
  • Overprocessing – eliminate that, less to do.
  • Materials – somebody has to bring those excess materials. Somebody has to count them, transport them, weigh them. Somebody has to dispose of the scrap.
  • Inconsistent work or disruptions: Eliminate those and people are done early more often than they were. More idle time.

If you look at a load chart, these are all things which push the cycle times down. You have converted the other wastes to the waste of waiting.

Now your challenge is how to convert that wait time to productivity. What you do depends on your circumstance. You can drop the takt time and increase output with the same people. Or you can to a major re-balance and free up people – do the same with fewer, and divert those resources to something productive elsewhere.

Does something stop you from doing that? Do you have two half-high bars that you can’t combine onto one person? Start asking “Why?” and you have your next kaizen project. Maybe you have to move those processes closer together, or untie a worker from a machine.

Summary:

  • Don’t worry too much about teaching categories of waste. Teach people to see what is truly value-adding, and to realize everything else is waste – something to streamline or eliminate.
  • In most cases your kaizen activity will result in more waste of waiting. This is good because wait-time is the only waste that converts directly to increased productivity.
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Supplier Selection: Beyond Quality, Delivery, Cost

Do you have a responsibility to make sourcing decisions on anything other than Quality, Delivery, Cost? This news item about a mass-fatality industrial fire in China opens up some interesting thoughts about sourcing over here.

For future reference after the link dies, the lead of the story is:

A fire at an illegal shoe factory in eastern China has left 34 people dead..

That, by the way, is a great lead. It summarizes the whole thing in a few words:

  • China
  • illegal factory
  • fire
  • 34 dead

The rest is just syntax glue. But, as usual, I digress. What the hell is the point?

Just to be clear, by the way, the original breaking-news story in no way implies that this factory was producing for export, or for that matter, for any other company. So the story is just a lead-in for this post.

Back to the lead of this article: What is your obligation, as a purchasing company, to consider things other than quality, delivery, cost in your sourcing decision?

With the rush to source in China, it is very easy to overlook even obvious things like quality. Just ask Mattel. But if gross violations of China’s internal health, safety and environmental regulations give a potential supplier a cost advantage, do you know it? Do you make a conscious decision to let that “advantage” stand? Or do you go and look for yourself, and include only suppliers which comply with the letter and the spirit of the law – as well as “do the right thing?”

Chinese health, safety and environmental regulations, by the way, are in many cases stricter than what you find in the USA or Europe. Compliance and enforcement, though, is… ah… spotty.

This is, in my mind, an ethical decision, not a legal or financial one. I can only raise the question and let you answer it in your own mind.

One more thing. This was reported on the BBC. The only way I can read BBC news on the internet in China is to go through my corporate VPN. If you try to access BBC News on a normal internet connection, you will get a “Server not responding” error because BBC is not considered appropriate for the Chinese people to read. Frankly, it seems a little arbitrary since every other news service is more or less accessible. Maybe I will start another blog sometime and just talk about “other stuff.”

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The Seventh Flow

Those of you who are familiar with Shingijutsu’s materials and teaching (or at least familiar with Nakao-san’s version of things) have heard of “The Seven Flows.” As a brief overview for everyone else, the original version, and my interpretations are:

  1. The flow of people.
  2. The flow of information.
  3. The flow of raw materials (incoming materials).
  4. The flow of sub-assemblies (work-in-process).
  5. The flow of finished goods (outgoing materials).
  6. The flow of machines.
  7. The flow of engineering. (The subject of this post.)

A common explanation of “the flow of engineering” is “the footprints of the engineer on the shop floor.” I suppose that is nice-sounding at a philosophical level, but it doesn’t do anything for me because I still didn’t get what it looks like (unless we make engineers walk through wet paint before going to the work area).

Common interpretations are to point to all of the great gadgets, gizmos and devices that it does take an engineer (or at least someone with an engineer’s mindset, if not the formal training) to design and produce.

I think that misses the point.

All of those gizmos and gadgets should be there as countermeasures to real, actual problems that have either been encountered or were anticipated and prevented. But that is not a “flow.” It is a result.

My “put” here is that “The Flow Of Engineering” is better expressed as “The Flow of Problem Solving.”

When a problem is encountered in the work flow, what is the process to:

  • Detect that there even is a problem. (“A deviation from the standard”)
  • Stop trying to continue to blindly execute the same process as though there was no problem.
  • Fix or correct the problem to restore (at a minimum) safety and protect downstream from any quality issues.
  • Determine why it happened in the first place, and apply an effective countermeasure against the root cause.

If you do not see plain, clear, and convincing evidence that this is happening as you walk through or observe your work areas, then frankly, it probably isn’t happening.

Other evidence that it isn’t happening:

At the cultural and human-interaction level:

  • Leaders saying things like “Don’t just bring me the problem, bring a solution!” or belittling people for bring up “small problems” instead of just handling them.
  • People who bring up problems being branded as “complainers.”
  • A system where any line stop results in overtime.
  • No simple, on/off signal to call for assistance. No immediate response.
    • If initially getting help requires knowing who to phone, and making a long explanation before anyone else shows up, that ain’t it.
  • “Escalation” as something the customer (or customer process) does when the supplying organization doesn’t respond. Escalation must be automatic and based on elapsed-time-without-resolution.

Go look. How is your “Flow of Problem Solving?