Managing To Learn (the book) – my first impressions

Managing to Learn bookManaging to Learn by John Shook is the latest in the classic series of books published by the Lean Enterprise Institute.

It is subtitled “Using the A3 management process to solve problems, gain agreement, mentor, and lead” and that pretty well sums it up.

Like many of the previous LEI books, it is built around a straightforward working example as a vehicle to demonstrate the basic principles. As such, it shares all of the strengths and shortcomings of its predecessors.

In my admittedly limited experience, I have seen a couple of companies try to embrace similar processes without real success. The main issue has been that the process quickly became “filling out a form.” Soon the form itself became (if you will pardon the term) a pro-forma exercise. Leadership did not directly engage in the process; and no one challenged a shortcut, jumping to a pet solution, or verified actual results (much less predicted them). Frankly, in these cases, it was either taught badly from the beginning, or (probably worse) the fad spread more quickly than the organization could learn how to do it well.

I must admit that with the recent flood of books and articles about the “A3” as the management and problem solving tool of lean, that we will see a macro- case of the same though throughout industry.

Managing to Learn tries to address this by devoting most of its emphasis on how the leader teaches by guiding and mentoring a team member through the problem solving process. The reader learns the process by following along with this experience, vs. just being told what to put in each block of the paper.

To illustrate this in action, the narrative is written in two tracks. One column describes the story from the problem solver’s viewpoint as he is guided through the process. He jumps to a conclusion, is pulled away from it, and gently but firmly directed through the process of truly understanding the situation; the underlying causes; developing possible countermeasures and implementing them.

Running parallel to that is another column which describes the thoughts of his teacher / manager.

Personally, found this difficult to follow and would prefer a linear narrative. I am perfectly fine with text that intersperses the thoughts and viewpoints of the characters with the shared actions. But given this alternative choice of format, I would have found it a lot easier to track if there had been clear synchronization points between the two story lines. I found myself flipping back and forth between pages, where sentences break from one page to the next in one column, but not the other, and it was difficult to tell at what point I was losing pace with the other column.

To be clear, Shook says in the introduction that the reader can read both at once (as I attempted to do), read one, then the other, or any other way that works. I tried, without personal success, to turn it into a linear narrative by reading a bit of one, then the other.

The presentation format not withstanding, Shook drives home a few crucially important points about this process.

  • It is not about filling out the form. It is a thought process. Trying to impose a structured form inevitably drives people’s focus toward filling out the form “correctly” rather than solving the problem with good thinking.
  • He emphasizes the leadership aspect of true problem solving. The leader / teacher may even have a good idea what the problem and solution are, but does not simply direct actions. Instead, the leader guides his team member through the process of discovering the situation for himself. This gets the problem solved, but also develops the people in the organization.

There are also a few real gems buried in the text – a few words, or a phrase in a paragraph on a page – that deserve to have attention called out to them. I am going to address those in separate posts over the next few days.

In the end this book can provide a glimpse of a future state for leadership in a true learning and problem solving culture. But if I were asked if the message is driven home in a way that passes the “sticky test” then I have to say, no. I wish it did, we need this kind of thinking throughout industry and the public and government sectors.

Thus, while this book is very worthwhile reading for the engaged practitioner to add to his insight and skill set, it is not a book I would give someone who was not otherwise enlightened and expect that he would have a major shift in his approach as a result of reading it.

The bottom line: If you are reading this in my site, you will probably find this book worthwhile, but don’t expect that having everyone read it will cause a change in the way your organization thinks and learns.

Anchoring a Problem Solving Culture

More than a few organizations I know are starting to understand the importance of establishing a culture of problem solving. Hopefully they are shifting from a tools implementation model to one which emphasizes how people respond to the daily friction generators.

In an email on the topic to a friend today, I cited four things that I think need to be there before this can be achieved. Upon reflection, I’d like to expand upon and share them. I think I can say that a lot of the failures I have seen can be traced back to only emphasizing one or two of them.

The organization must reset its definition of “a problem.”

I started to get at this mindset back in January with the post “Chatter as Signal.”

In “traditional” organizations something is labeled “a problem” when it causes enough disruption (or annoys the right (wrong?) person). Anything that does not cross that threshold is tolerated. The “problem” with this approach is that many small issues are ignored and worked around. Their effects, though, tend to clump and cluster into larger cumulative symptoms. When those symptoms reach the threshold of pain, someone starts wanting some kind of action, but by now it is too late for simple solutions.

Another face of the same thinking is the “big problem” syndrome. “We can’t fix everything.” “We have to prioritize on the big hitters.” True enough, but it is not necessary to fix everything at once. That’s the point. Sure, prioritize the technically tough problems. But, at the same time, put the systems into place that allow everyone to work on the little ones, every day.

When the “big problem” statements are used as a “can’t do it” or “we can never be perfect” excuse, the organization’s underlying mindset has dropped into the ”

The “Chatter as Signal” attitude really means instead of putting together plans and processes and then tossing them over a wall for blind execution, the problem solving organization systematically and continuously checks “reality” (what really happens) against their “theory” (the plan, what they expect to happen). Whenever there is a difference between the two, they look at that as “a problem.”

Maybe the term “problem” is unfortunate.

A lot is made out there about being truly forward-looking organizations seeing “mistakes” as opportunities to learn. A “mistake” is nothing other than an instance of “We did this thinking some specific thing would happen, but something unexpected happened instead.” Or “We thought we could do it this way, but it turns out we couldn’t.” In different words, those events are “the outcome wasn’t what we planned” and “we couldn’t execute the process as planned.” In other words, “problems.”

In summary, specify what you intend to accomplish, how and when you intend to do it.
Any departure, necessary or inadvertent, from this specification is a problem.

The organization must have a process for immediately detecting and responding to problems.

It doesn’t do much good to define a problem unless you intend to respond. And you can’t stand and watch every second for problems to occur. That is the whole point of jidoka. When Sakichi Toyoda developed his loom, the prevailing common thinking was “sometimes the threads break.” “When that happens, some material is ruined.” “That is reality.” “Perfection is impossible.” Chatter is noise.

But Sakichi changed the dynamic when he designed a loom that detected a broken thread and shut itself down before any bad material was woven. Now I am fairly certain that, even today, threads break on weaving equipment. (And the same technology developed by Sakichi is used to detect it.) So, as a jidoka, this is a case of detecting a small problem and containing it immediately so it can be corrected.

Consider this: If the organization really understands jidoka then any problem that goes undetected is a problem. Thus, it isn’t necessary to fix it all at once. Rather, when problems occur, get back to where they occured. Look at the actual situation. What was the very first detectable departure from the intended process? It is quite likely that it is a small thing, and also likely it happens all the time. But this time it didn’t get caught and corrected.

Then ask: Can you prevent this departure from process?
If you can’t, can it be immediately and automatically corrected?
If not, can the process be stopped?

But detecting the problem is only the first step. The response is even more important. When a Team Member (or a machine) detects a problem and calls for help, a real live human needs to show up and show genuine interest. The immediate issue is simple: Fix the problem. Restore a safe operation that produces defect-free output. That may take a temporary countermeasure involving some improvisation, and may compromise speed and cost a little, but safety and quality are never compromised for anything… right?

The next step is to start the process of actually solving the problem. At a minimum, it needs to be written down and put into the “We’ll work on that” management queue (See the next item) to get solved. Note that “fixing it” and “solving it” are two completely separate things.

The organization must have a process for managing problem solving.

When a problem occurs, the first response is to detect it, then to fix (or contain) it. That is jidoka. But at some point, someone has to investigate why it happened, get to the root cause, and establish a robust countermeasure.

Again, I have talked around this in a couple of previous posts:
Systematic Problem Solving
A Systematic Approach to Part Shortages

However it is done, however, the organizations that do it well:

  • Have a public written record of what problems are on the radar. The most common approach is a board of some kind in the area where the daily review takes place.
  • Did I just say “Daily Review?” There is a process to check the status of ongoing problem solving activity every day. Problems being worked on do not get a chance to fall off the radar.
  • They manage their talent. The organization I talked about in the “Part Shortages” story had a lot of problems, not just in part shortages, but technical issues as well. Initially they had been assigning each problem to someone as soon as it came up. That quickly became unworkable because, in spite of their tremendous talent, the key players really couldn’t focus on more than one or two things at a time. It was demoralizing for them to get hammered at the meetings for “doing nothing” on five problems because they had been working on the other two. The countermeasure was a prioritized pull system. Each new problem went into a queue. As a problem solver became available (because s/he was done with one), the next problem on the list was assigned. The prioritization system was simple: The manufacturing manager could re-sequence the queue at any time.Thus, the problem at the top of the list — the next one to be assigned — was always the next most important. But it was another important rule that made this work. No one could be pulled off a problem s/he was already working on in favor of a “hot” problem. The only exceptions were a safety issue or a defect that had escaped the factory and had been reported by a customer. However you manage it, keep these things in mind:
    • Don’t arbitrarily multi-task your talent. People can’t multi-task. This is actually overloading. The other word for it is muri.
    • Don’t jerk them from one thing to the next without allowing them completion.
  • They solve the problem at the lowest level of the organization capable of solving it. The corollary here is largely covered below, but it bears mentioning here: If the level that should be solving it isn’t capable then they work THAT problem – developing the skill – rather than ignoring the issue or overloading someone who is never going to have the time to work on it. This is probably the most important lesson in this piece.

They deliberately and systematically develop their problem solving skills at all levels.

It is easy to fall into the trap of assuming that someone with a technical degree is a skilled problem solver and critical thinker. Experience suggests otherwise. And even if there are a couple of people who just have the innate talent, there are not enough of them to go around. There are lots of approaches out there. In reality, all of the effective ones are anchored in the same thinking, they just use different tools and lingo to frame that thinking. My best advice is pick one, teach everyone to use it, then insist that they follow the process exactly. Only by doing that will you actually learn if the process itself has weakness or shortcomings.

Along with this is don’t confuse the tools with the process itself. THIS IS CRITICAL: Anything you draw on paper (or create in a computer) is a tool. The seven problem solving tools are not a process. A statistical control chart is not a process. An A3 is not a process. A cloud diagram is not a process. All of these are tools. The framework in which they are used is structured thinking, and that is a process.

This is important because the process itself is straight forward and simple. It can be taught to anyone. Teaching them the tools, however, teaches them nothing at all about how to solve problems. So many “problem solving courses” spend a week teaching people how to build Pareto charts, histograms, tree diagrams, run charts, even build control charts, and yet teach nothing at all about how to solve problems. Most problems can be solved by unsophisticated troubleshooting techniques that systematically eliminate possible causes. Some can’t, but most can.

This got long, but I guess I had a lot to say on the topic. In the background, I am planning on putting together some basic material on “the process of problem solving” and making it available. Hopefully that will help.

As always, comments are encouraged and appreciated. It tells me that someone actually reads this stuff.

There Are (almost) No Big Problems

In a “management by metrics” world, problems are detected when performance indicators are off track. Perhaps inventory is too high, first pass quality is a problem. Maybe operational availability is tanking.

Once the problems are abstracted into numbers, the numbers become the problem. The solution, then, is usually a directive to reverse the trend, to improve this measurement or that measurement, to get things back on track.

Here is the rub: The numbers aren’t the problem. They don’t even tell you what the problem is without a whole lot of investigation, digging, and stratification. And why was this investigation and stratification necessary in the first place? Because now you are trying to sort out a batch of problems that weren’t dealt with, one-by-one, at the moment they occurred.

The further you go up in the organization, the more things are aggregated and summarized. And the more they are aggregated and summarized, the more things look like big problems, even though they are composed of many (hundreds, sometimes) of little problems.

Let me cite an example. I was in a factory where the site manager was proudly showing off his real time display of Overall Equipment Effectiveness (OEE). Each time the equipment slowed, for any reason, the display would immediately change. He could see, at an instant, how the day’s OEE compared with his target, and, he said, “take action.”

But exactly what action is he going to take?
Even the real-time display lags the actual problem.
Two weeks ago a lubrication point was missed. Today something is overheating, and we need to slow or stop the machine to deal with it.

A bracket securing a roller is loose, today the machine is stopping all the time as they clear jams.

A hole in a screen let chips and debris clog a filter, and the coolant pumps are overheating.

This list can go on. The point is that the things that actually slow down or stop the machinery are second, third, fourth levels in chains of events. The actual problem had no immediate effect on the machinery.

In this system, the very best they will ever do is fix it fast and hold the number at some level. They will never be able to actually improve it, because they aren’t dealing with the underlying systemic issue: They aren’t finding and dealing with the actual root causes.

When you get to financial measures, things are even more abstract.

Inventory levels (or inversely, inventory turns) is a great example. “We have too much inventory!” “Our inventory levels are above the industry norm!”

In the boardroom, or in the Chief of Operations’ office, this is all they can see. Because most leaders in that position really like direct action, they.. um.. “direct” that some “action” be taken.

So the organization goes to war against inventory.

Two levels down, “We have too much inventory” is still characterized as the problem because that is what they have to report every month.

Two more levels down it is often still attacking the symptom – too much inventory.

But inventory isn’t the problem.

The problem is an engineering change that missed one part on the bill of material update, delaying production for a day while all of the other parts continued to roll in.

The problem is a paint system that is unreliable, so the factory obsesses on maintaining four hours of buffer on either side of it.

The problem is pressure to keep the line moving, so people work ahead, and push incomplete or problem units into the “hospital” for later repair.

The problem is that the upstream processes have to be ready to respond to massive fluctuations in assembly’s demand.

The problem is a broken jig, local initiative to make something else instead, resulting in too much of what nobody needs and none of what they do – because they don’t want to waste time doing nothing.

An additional problem is that the typical organizational response to these problems is to add more inventory because each local unit needs to protect itself from the dysfunction problems of their suppliers and customers.

Worse, just “taking out inventory” is going to tank everything else because the underlying problems are still there.

Inventory isn’t the problem.

The problem is that each of these small problems is too small to bother addressing as a systematic breakdown that leads to “too much inventory.” While the high-level leaders are looking for a big problem, they are missing their real responsibility.

It isn’t to “do something about inventory.”
It is to ensure that the small problems that occur every day, the ones which cause all of that inventory to accumulate in the first place, actually get addressed. Actually no. Their responsibility is to ensure there are systems in place which catch those problems and address them. They do this by teaching, setting example, then checking.

Leaders – if you want to “do something about inventory” you have to do it by setting an expectation that:

  • Processes are well defined.
  • Those processes are followed.
  • When there is a problem following the process, it is raised immediately.
  • When a problem is raised, it is swarmed, fixed, understood and prevented.

You handle big problems by making sure the small ones are dealt with, every day, all day.

Then your OEE will go up quickly. OEE is an indicator of how well you respond to problems, not how well your machines run.

One more thing – for my Health Care readers.
You can substitute “medication errors” for any of this. But until there is a system in place that alerts anytime someone spots the possibility of confusion, medication errors will occur at pretty much the same rate they always have.

Attack on Ambiguity

When real effort is spent getting to the cause of problems (vs. a reflex to find someone to blame), ambiguity often enters into the picture.

Problem solving is a process of asking questions and clarification.

Is a “defect-free” outcome of the process specified? Does the Team Member know what “success” is?
Is there a way for the Team Member to actually verify the result?
Does that check give the Team Member a clear Yes/No; Met/Not Met; Pass/Fail response? Or is there interpretation and judgment involved?

If there is good specification for “defect-free” – is there a specification for how to achieve it? Do you know what must be done to assure the result that you want? Does the Team Member know? Is the Team Member guided through the process? Are there verifications (poka-yoke, etc) at critical points?

If all of the above is in place, do you know what conditions must be in place for success? What is the minimum pressure for your air tools? Is there a pressure gage? Does it cut off the tool if the pressure is too low? Is there some visual check that all of the required parts, pieces, tools are there before work starts? Thank about the things you assume are there when the Team Member gets started.

For ALL OF THE ABOVE, if something isn’t right, is there a clear, unambiguous way to alert the Team Member immediately?
Is there a clear way for the Team Member to alert the chain-of-support that something isn’t right?

If there is a defined result, a defined process to achieve it, and all of the conditions required for success are present –
Is the Team Member alerted if he deviates from the specified process, or if a critical intermediate result is not right?
More poka-yoke.

Now you have the very basics for consistent execution.

Is the process carried out as you expect?
Is the result what you expected?

If not, then the process may be clear, but it clearly does not work. Stop, investigate. Fix it.

All of this is about getting more and more about what is SUPPOSED to happen and compare it to what is REALLY happening… continuously. I say continuously because “continuous improvement” does not happen unless there is continuous checking and continuous correction and problem solving. If you want “continuous improvement” you cannot rely on special “events” to get it. It has to be embedded into the work that is done every day.

Ask “Why?” – but How?

Get to the root cause by “Asking Why?” five times.
We have all heard it, read it. Our sensei’s have pounded it into us. It is a cliché, obviously, since getting to the root cause of a problem is (most of the time) a touch more complicated than just repeatedly asking “Why?”

Isn’t it?

Maybe not. Maybe it is a matter of skill.

Some people are really good at it. They seem to instinctively get to the core issue, and they are usually right. Others take the “Problem Solving” class and still seem to struggle. So what is it that the “naturals” do unconsciously?

Let me introduce another piece of data here. “Problem Solving” is taught to be an application of the scientific method. The scientific method, in turn, is hypothesis testing. How does that relate to “ask why? five times” ?

Each iteration of asking “why?” is an iteration of hypothesis testing.

How do you “ask why?”

Observe and gather information.
Formulate possible hypotheses.
For each reasonable possibility, determine what information would confirm or refute it. (Devise experiments, which really means “Decide what questions to ask next and figure out a way to answer them.”)
Observe, gather information, experiment. Get answers to those questions.
Confirm or refute possible causes.

At each level, a confirmed cause is the result of “observe and gather information” so the process iterates back to the top.

Eventually, though, a point is reached where going further either obviously makes no sense, or is of no additional help. If you are now looking at something you can fix, you are at the “root cause” for the purpose of the exercise. Yes, you can probably keep going, but part of this is knowing how far is far enough.

Is this something I can fix easily?
Does it make sense to go further?

Otherwise, iterate again.

Now: Devise a countermeasure.

A countermeasure, itself, is a hypothesis. You are saying “If I take this action, I should get this result” i.e. the problem goes away.

Put the countermeasure into place. Does it work? That is yet another experiment only now you are (hopefully) confirming or refuting your fix on every production cycle. The andon will tell you if you are right.

We tell people “Ask why five times” but we really don’t teach them how to “ask why.”

The book examples usually show this neat chain of cause/effect/cause/effect, but the real world isn’t that tidy. When the problem is first being investigated, each level often has many possibilities. Once the chain is built then the chain can be used as a check.

But that isn’t how you GET there.

Why don’t the books do a good job teaching this?

“They” say that critical thinking is difficult to teach. I disagree. If the people who do it unconsciously can step back and become consciously competent, and know how they do it, then it breaks down into a skill, and a skill can be taught.

A Real World Example
My computer works, but it’s network connection to the outside world doesn’t.
OK. What could be wrong?
It could be software in the computer.
It could be a problem with the hardware.

Look at where the cable plugs into the back of the computer. Are the little lights flashing? No? Then there is no data going through that connection.

How could that be?

Well.. the it could be a problem in the computer or operating system.
It could be a problem with the hardware in the computer.
It could be a bad cable.
It could be a problem behind the network jack on the wall.

The QUICKEST thing to do is unplug the cable and plug my co-worker’s cable into the computer. (Please make sure he isn’t busy with email before you do this!). Do the lights come on? Yes? Does your network stuff work now? Yes? Then it isn’t anything in the computer. You have just done a hypothesis test – conducted an experiment.

Take his KNOWN GOOD cable out of the wall and plug it into your jack. Does your network work now? Yes? You have a bad cable. No? It is a problem behind the jack.. call I.T. and tell them. (unless you are at home, then head to the little blue box in the basement and start looking at flashing lights down there. But same process.. as you systematically eliminate internal causes, you are left with an external one.)

This is a natural flow, but most people wouldn’t describe it as “asking why?” or “hypothesis testing” – and the big words scare them off.

Still – when you (the lean guru) are teaching others, it is important for them to understand HOW TO ASK WHY is just a process of learning by systematic elimination of the impossible. (Whatever remains, however unlikely, must be the truth – Author Conan Doyle through Sherlock Holmes)

Systematic Problem Solving

If I were to look at the experience of the organization profiled in the last three posts “A Systematic Approach to Part Shortages” I believe their biggest breakthrough was cultural. By applying the “morning market” as a process of managing problems, they began a shift from a reactive organization to a problem solving culture.

I can cite two other data points which suggest that when an organization starts managing problem solving in a systematic way, their performance begins to steadily improve. Even managing problem solving a little bit better results in much more consistent improvement and less backsliding. Of course my personal experience is only anecdotal. That is certainly true by the time you read it here as I try to filter things. But consider this: The key difference with Toyota’s approach that Steven Spear pointed out in “Decoding the DNA of the Toyota Production System” (as well as his PhD dissertation) was that the application of rules of flow triggered problem solving activity whenever there was a gap between expected and actual process or expected and actual outcome.

Does this mean you should go out and implement morning market’s everywhere? Again, based on my single company data point, no. That doesn’t work any more than attaching kanban cards to all of your parts and calling it a pull system. It is not about the white boards, it is not even about reviewing the problems every day. Reactive organizations do that too. In most cases in the Big Company that implemented morning markets everywhere, that is what happened – they morphed into another format for the Same Old Stuff.

Here are some of the things my example organization did that I think contributed to success in their cultural shift.

  • They separated “containment” and “countermeasure” as two separate and distinct responses. This was to make sure that they all understood “containment” is what is done immediately to re-start production while preserving safety and quality. “Containment” was not a countermeasure as it rarely (if ever) actually addressed the root cause. It only isolated the effect of the problem as far upstream as possible. The rule of thumb was simple:
    • Containment nearly always adds time, cost, resources, etc.
    • A true countermeasure nearly always removes not only the containment, but reduces time, cost, resources.
  • They didn’t use the meetings to discuss solutions. They only addressed two things:
    • A quick update on the status of ongoing problem solving.
    • A quick overview of new problems from yesterday.

I think this is an important point because too many meetings get bogged down with people talking about problems, and speculating what the causes are. That is completely non-productive.

  • The actual people working on problems attended the meeting. I cannot over-emphasize how important this is. They did not send a single representative. Each person with expected activity reported his or her progress over the last 24 hours. It is difficult to stand in front of a group and say “I didn’t do anything.”
  • They blocked out time to work on problems. I probably should have put this one first. The manufacturing engineers and other professional problem solvers agreed not to schedule anything else for at least two hours every morning. This time was dedicated to working on the shop floor to understand the problem, and physically experiment with solutions. There was a lot of resistance to this. But over a couple of months it became close to the norm. It helped a lot because it started to drive the group to consider where they really spent their time vs. what they needed to get done. There was no doubt in the past that solving these problems was important, but it was never urgent. Nobody was ever asked why they weren’t working on a shop floor issue. That had been a “when I am done with everything else activity.” Gradually the group developed a stronger sense of the shop floor as their customer.
  • They didn’t assign problems until someone was available to work on them. This came a little later, when the problem-solvers were missing deadlines. The practice had been to assign a responsible person in the morning when the problem was first reviewed. Realistically a person can work on one problem a time, and perhaps work on another when waiting for something. They established a priority list. The priority was set primarily by manufacturing. When a problem-solver became available, the next item on the list was assigned. Once a problem was assigned, nothing would over-ride that assignment except a safety issue or a defect that had actually escaped the plant and reached a customer.
  • They got everyone formal training on problem solving with heavy emphasis on true root cause. People were expected to follow the method.
  • A problem was not cleared from the board until a long term countermeasure had been implemented and verified as working.

By blocking out time, they were able to establish some kind of expectation for productivity. After that, if problems were accumulating faster than they were being cleared, they knew they had a methods or resource issue. The same was true for their other tasks which were worked on during the rest of the day.

This was the start of establishing a form of standard work for the problem solvers.

21 Oct 08 – There is more on the subject here and here

A Systematic Approach to Part Shortages – Part 3

The third element of this organization’s successful drive to eliminate part shortages was a systematic approach to problem solving. They made it a process, managed just like any other process, rather than something people did when they had time. Even though this is “Part 3” of this series, in reality they put this into place at the same time, and actually a little ahead, of kanban and leveling.

The Morning Market

The idea of the “morning market” came from a chapter in Imai’s book “Gemba Kaizen.” He describes a process where the previous day’s defects are physically set out on a table and reviewed first thing in the morning – “while they are fresh” hence the analogy to the morning markets.

This organization had been trying to practice the concept of a morning market for a few weeks, and was beginning to get it into an actual process. Because supplier problems constituted a major cause of disruption, they set up a separate morning market for defective purchased parts.

That process branched yet again into a morning market for part shortages. And this evolved into a bit of a mental breakthrough.

They started looking at process defects.

Every shortage, every day, was recorded on the board.

Each morning the previous day’s shortages were reviewed. They were grouped into three categories based on knowledge of the cause – just like outlined in the book.

  • “A” problems – they knew the cause, knew the countermeasure, but had some excuse reason why it could not be implemented right away.
  • “B” problems – they knew the cause, but did not have a good countermeasure yet.
  • “C” problems – knew the symptom (parts weren’t there) but didn’t know why.

The mental breakthrough was systematically investigating the reason each and every shortage occurred. What they found was that in the vast majority of cases it was an internal process breakdown, rather than some problem at the supplier, that caused the shortage. This was a bit of a revelation.

They began systematically fixing their processes, one problem at a time.

Over time things got better. Simultaneously they were implementing the kanban system. Kanban comes with its own set of possible problems, like cards getting lost. Once again, when they found problems they went into the morning market and were systematically addressed.

After a few months into their kanban implementation, for example, they started turning in card audits with far less than 2% irregularities, and then it was not unusual for a card audit to find no problems at all. Why? They had addressed the reasons why cards end up somewhere other than where they should be. Instead of blaming people, they looked for why people acting in good faith would not follow the process.

This was also an attitude shift – assume a flaw in the process itself, or in communication, before looking for “who did it.”

Eventually the warehouse team had their own morning market. As did the receiving team. As did the parts picking team. As did assembly. Each looked at any case where they were not able to deliver exactly what their downstream customer needed.

About 8 months into this, another group in an adjacent building, was trying to work through their own issues. They came over for a tour. One of the supervisors, visibly shaken, came to me and said

“Now I get it. These people work together in a fundamentally different way.”

And they did. They worked as a team, focusing on the problems, not on each other.

And that, readers, is the goal of “lean manufacturing.” If you aren’t working toward that, then you aren’t really implementing anything.

The Seventh Flow

Those of you who are familiar with Shingijutsu’s materials and teaching (or at least familiar with Nakao-san’s version of things) have heard of “The Seven Flows.” As a brief overview for everyone else, the original version, and my interpretations are:

  1. The flow of people.
  2. The flow of information.
  3. The flow of raw materials (incoming materials).
  4. The flow of sub-assemblies (work-in-process).
  5. The flow of finished goods (outgoing materials).
  6. The flow of machines.
  7. The flow of engineering. (The subject of this post.)

A common explanation of “the flow of engineering” is “the footprints of the engineer on the shop floor.” I suppose that is nice-sounding at a philosophical level, but it doesn’t do anything for me because I still didn’t get what it looks like (unless we make engineers walk through wet paint before going to the work area).

Common interpretations are to point to all of the great gadgets, gizmos and devices that it does take an engineer (or at least someone with an engineer’s mindset, if not the formal training) to design and produce.

I think that misses the point.

All of those gizmos and gadgets should be there as countermeasures to real, actual problems that have either been encountered or were anticipated and prevented. But that is not a “flow.” It is a result.

My “put” here is that “The Flow Of Engineering” is better expressed as “The Flow of Problem Solving.”

When a problem is encountered in the work flow, what is the process to:

  • Detect that there even is a problem. (“A deviation from the standard”)
  • Stop trying to continue to blindly execute the same process as though there was no problem.
  • Fix or correct the problem to restore (at a minimum) safety and protect downstream from any quality issues.
  • Determine why it happened in the first place, and apply an effective countermeasure against the root cause.

If you do not see plain, clear, and convincing evidence that this is happening as you walk through or observe your work areas, then frankly, it probably isn’t happening.

Other evidence that it isn’t happening:

At the cultural and human-interaction level:

  • Leaders saying things like “Don’t just bring me the problem, bring a solution!” or belittling people for bring up “small problems” instead of just handling them.
  • People who bring up problems being branded as “complainers.”
  • A system where any line stop results in overtime.
  • No simple, on/off signal to call for assistance. No immediate response.
    • If initially getting help requires knowing who to phone, and making a long explanation before anyone else shows up, that ain’t it.
  • “Escalation” as something the customer (or customer process) does when the supplying organization doesn’t respond. Escalation must be automatic and based on elapsed-time-without-resolution.

Go look. How is your “Flow of Problem Solving?

“Packaging” is spelled M-U-D-A

In Mike Wroblewski’s blog “Got Boondoggle?” he comments on just how much packaging and dunnage is not visible in Toyota’s Industrial Equipment plant. Of course that is remarkable because of just how common it is to find the opposite condition. Factories (and offices) have lots of packaging around, and spend lots of time dealing with it.

Toyota has been working on this a long time. They have the added advantage of being an 800 pound gorilla with most of their suppliers. They can specify packaging and insist on things being done a certain way. In a lot of cases it is the supplier that is the 800 pound gorilla, and a lot of small companies have a hard time being heard. But you can still make a lot of difference if you apply the principle that packaging is muda.

A frequently invoked (and overworked analogy) is the assembler or operator as a surgeon. Everything must be ready for the value-add operation to be performed waste free. If there is waste in the process, keep it away from this point. Surgical instruments come in packages. But I can assure you the surgeon is not unwrapping the scalpel. So who is?

The instruments are prepared and made ready for use by the staff.

Now take this to your factory floor. The first step is to keep dunnage and packaging out of the production area. There are actually a lot of advantages to doing this. The chief one is obviously optimizing your value-add time. But all of that packaging also takes up space. EVERYTHING that enters the production area MUST have a process (meaning a person!) to get it OUT of the production area. Since you have to unpackage that stuff anyway, do it before it gets to production. This means that someone else picks the part and prepares it for use just like the staff in the operating room.

Do this and you have applied one of the principles Liker and Meier point out in The Toyota Way Fieldbook – if you can’t eliminate sources of variation, then isolate them. In other words, set up a barrier that contains the waste so that your value-adding operation sees the result of a perfect supplier.

You can then take the next step: Do this at receiving. If the parts do not arrive from the supplier packed the way that your internal material conveyance system needs them, then put the resources into receiving to convert what you get from your suppliers into what you wish you got from them.

This is applying the principle of systematically pushing waste upstream, closer to the point where it originates. The other thing you have done is force yourself to dedicate resources to deal with this waste instead of spreading it so thin the cost is hidden. You will know what it costs you in terms of people, time, space, etc. to deal with the fact that your suppliers don’t ship what you need. By highlighting the problem instead of burying it, you have the opportunity to address it.

One more thing – it might seem easier to take these little wastes and spread them thin. After all, if everybody just does one or two trivial tasks, it doesn’t seem so bad, does it? It is those trivial wastes, those 5 second, 30 second, 1 minute little things that accumulate to half your productivity. It takes work to see them and eliminate them. Don’t add more to the process on purpose.

Invert the Problem

One very good idea-creation tool is “inverting the problem” – developing ideas on how to cause the effect you are trying to prevent. This is a common approach for developing mistake-proofing, but I just saw a great use of the idea for general teaching.

Ask “How could we make this operation take as long as possible?” Then collect ideas from the team. Everything on the flip chart will be some form of waste that you are trying to avoid. In many cases, I think, even the most resistant minds would concede that nothing on this list is something we would do on purpose.

It follows, then, that if we see we are doing it that we ought to try to stop doing it. And that is what kaizen is all about.