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Is Quality Losing to Cost?

Tom posed an interesting question on The Whiteboard.

Has anybody else noticed that quality is taking a back seat lately due to the tough economic conditions? Things are tough everywhere, but I’m seeing more and more evidence of companies taking short cuts (to cut costs) where the end result is poor quality.

I’ll say what I think, but I would also like to invite anyone else to comment as well. This is an important issue.

Background:

First, it is important to understand that the term “quality” carries at least three definitions. There may be more, but here is how I came to understand them.

  1. Grade: The product’s position in the market.
  2. Fitness for use: Whether the product is suitable for the customer’s intended purpose.
  3. Conformance to specification: Whether the product is as the producer intended it.

Some examples.

Grade:

In air travel, there are two (and sometimes three) grades of service offered on a typical flight. Coach is basic transportation. It gets you there quickly and safely. First Class gets you there just as quickly and just as safely as coach. But there are more amenities offered, the seats are bigger, in general it is more comfortable. First Class is a higher grade of product.

In the automobile market, we have expensive luxury cars, such as top-end BMW or Lexus. We have middle grade cars, we have basic cars. Even within a specific make and model, there are different trim levels that each carry a different “feel” as well as a different price.

Thus, the grade of the product reflects an effort to create higher value by adding features and amenities that probably go above and beyond the basic purpose.

It is important to understand that the grade of the product is set by the producer’s decisions on market position. They are trying to deliver more value in order to command higher prices.

Fitness for Use:

Fitness for use is defined from the perspective of the customer. The product is sold as being suitable for some purpose, and the customer buys it to fill a need. How well it fills that need is ultimately defined by the customer’s experience of the product in use. This is probably the easiest to screw up, as many companies tend to rely on internal experts or the highest-paid-person’s opinion rather than getting their shoes dirty and actually paying attention to what customers do with the product. It is easy to delete or alter a feature which turns out to be very important to the customer. Customers can also surprise you and find uses which were never intended by the original design.

Conformance to Specification:

Once the research is done, and the product designed, some kind of production system must be established to actually produce the product (or actually deliver the service, it is the same issue). Conformance to specification defines how well the product delivery actually matches the design intent. Where a Hilton Hotel may offer a higher grade of room than Motel 6, if both rooms are clean, ready for guests, and meet their respective hotel’s standards, then both conform to specification. The Hilton will have some kind of specification for how they deliver room service. Motel 6 has a Denny’s next door.

One More Example

If I am interested in knowing what time it is, a $35 Timex will do exactly the same job as a $5000 Rolex. With today’s quartz technology, they are both accurate within a second or two per month. So if knowing the time is my intended use, both watches are fit for use.

Clearly, however, there is a difference. The Rolex is a higher grade of product than the Timex. If my purpose is to demonstrate wealth or success, or present an extravagant gift, the Rolex is also more fit for that use.

But if they each work out of the box exactly as intended, have no scratches or other defects, then both watches conform to the specifications of their respective manufacturers. Both companies have excellent reputations for “quality” in that sense.

So now to Tom’s question.

Companies facing dramatically declining sales are under great cost pressure. Very few have limitless sources of cash to burn, and publicly held companies must also maintain the goodwill of their investors. In addition, many companies have credit covenants which require them to maintain certain ratios of debt, liabilities, assets, liquidity, etc, or face issues with their banks.

With that background, let’s look at how these pressures could drive decisions that affect quality.

Deliberate decisions are most likely to affect grade. Cheaper materials may be substituted, amenities or extra services can be cut back. Anyone who flys frequently has seen the steady erosion in previously “free” services and amenities as airlines come under increasing cost pressure. The danger here, of course, is that these decisions also reduce value in the eye of the customer, and with that, can reduce the price they are willing to pay or send them to a competitor. Thus, these “savings” can end up backfiring unless the entire industry is following pretty much the same path.

I think the more dangerous effect of turbulent times, however, is in the area of conformance to specification. But I don’t think this is the result of deliberate shortcuts. Rather, I think it is an unintended consequence at the intersection of a couple of other factors.

First, relatively few companies, be they production and manufacturing or service delivery, have an effective system of assuring that things are done the way they expect. When times are good, and employment is stable, the people develop their own individual feel for what is right and do their very best to do it. The level of quality will reach some kind of tolerable norm which may, or may not, conform to the specification.

Now mix things up. Lay off some of your workers, and move the others around. Different people are doing different jobs. Because the work is not well specified in the first place, and because there is likely no process to transfer “how to do it” (like TWI Job Instruction), people have to learn the hard way – by making mistakes. Add to the mix a perceived time pressure, and people will take shortcuts in a good faith effort to get the job done the way they think they are expected to.

If the “specification” itself is poorly defined as well, then the new “norm” for the organization could very well end up different (and worse) than what it was before. Add to that a management culture of acceptance of “what is, is” (an excused-based culture, more common than you think, especially in large companies), and you get a seeming erosion.

So here’s what I think – if Tom is seeing an erosion of quality, he is likely seeing the effect of the economic turmoil rather than deliberate decisions to cut corners. Further, is impossible to deliberately cut corners if no one has ever defined where the corners are in the first place. And that situation is more normal than not.

What is your view?

Do you see quality eroding?

If so, why do you think it is happening?

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Reprise (again) – Know Your Supply Chain

AP IMPACT: Chinese drywall poses potential risks

Although I hate to judge before all the facts are in, it’s beginning to
look like a huge set of customers got burned (once again) by quality problems from China.

Before I go any further, I have to say that I have spent loads of time in China. I have very close Chinese friends. The Chinese are like everyone else in the world – hard working honorable people. But, just like everywhere else in the world, now and then someone takes shortcuts with known technology, or doesn’t understand the “Why?” behind industry standard practices, and rarely, there is a real crook.

The great question, though, is “To what degree are the importers, builders and contractors culpable, and to whom?”

The U.S. arm of the Chinese company is swearing up and down that their product meets U.S. standards. Pretty standard rhetoric for muddling the issue.

I don’t even want to get into the legal issues here. They are going to be very messy.

But if you bought a car, and it turned out that the imported, outsourced seats were emitting noxious fumes, I doubt you would turn to the seat manufacturer to resolve the problem.

OEM’s? Know your suppliers, know your supply chain.

Unfortunately we will end up with a ton more government regulation as a result of industry being unable or unwilling to assure its own quality, and that is going to cost all of us.

Kind of makes the term “toxic assets” more real, doesn’t it?

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John Shook: Purpose, Process, People

Like many of us, John Shook has been commenting in his column about GM at a precipice seemingly of its own making. One of the questions he has addressed in a couple of columns is “What did GM learn from NUMMI?” or perhaps more precisely, “Why didn’t GM learn from NUMMI?”

John’s latest column, titled Purpose, Process, People, points out rather bluntly:

My answer to that question remains that GM actually learned far, far more than most people realize about process but didn’t get very far with the people part.

In an earlier column, John raises the possibility that perhaps GM and Toyota each view the world through different lenses of vastly differing purpose (what I could call core values, the things that aren’t written down, they just are within an organization).

Yes, GM wants to survive — hence the humbling appearances on Capitol Hill by Wagoner and the two other Detroit CEOs. Yet had GM been seeking long-term survival a la Toyota, it would have made different decisions all along. GM wants to survive, all right, it wants to survive so it can continue to make money. Toyota on the other hand, wants to make money to survive.

Think about that: Toyota makes money to survive; the Detroit 3 exist (survive) to make money. Those contrasting senses of purpose will take you down very different paths.

This conclusion lines up perfectly with GM’s behavior regarding their NUMMI opportunity.

…  And so it went — Toyota running NUMMI operations, GM selling Novas while dispatching people to NUMMI to learn.

… [by 1994] at least, GM still didn’t know how to make a small car profitably and still didn’t understand TPS. And here we are today. So the question remains: why not?

Why not indeed?

So we have a situation where Toyota is running a GM car plant, building an excellent small car. GM seems to have been treating it as a factory, with an ROI, rather than for what it really was: A learning laboratory for the GM as a whole. Yes, they sent thousands of GM people there “to learn” and then brought them back into their old work environments and what? Somehow expected these smart people to transform the company?

Here is what I think happened.

NUMMI was a factory. So who do you send to a factory?

You send factory managers. You send line managers. You send supervisors. You send people who have jobs in a factory so they can work with their NUMMI counterparts and learn from them. Makes perfect sense, doesn’t it?

And, as a sidebar to all of this, what was Toyota learning? They were learning how to transplant the TPS outside of Japan. They were learning how to teach their system to people who didn’t grow up in it.

Let’s look at the process Steven Spear outlines in Learning to Lead at Toyota. In this case, an experienced, seasoned senior leader comes from a U.S. auto company to Toyota. They need to teach him “how to lead at Toyota” and they need to do it reasonably quickly.

They don’t sit him down to Death By PowerPoint orientations. They don’t have him go through the financial. (at least not right away). They don’t put him in classes. And most importantly, they didn’t have him shadow another factory manager to “learn the job.”

Instead, they send him to the shop floor to, essentially, learn to be a Team Leader – a senior hourly Team Member. He has to un-learn how to provide the answers, and learn how to guide people to their own solutions. He has to learn to let go of the goals and targets and understand that those goals belong to the Team trying to meet them, not the boss. His job is simply to help them push their capabilities.

So what would it have taken for GM to have a chance to “get” what the Toyota System is all about?

Where was Roger Smith? Where were the other executives from Detroit? Ironically, this time period really marked the beginning of GM’s decline. My conjecture was that NUMMI was “a factory” and these senior corporate leaders felt they had nothing to learn there that could not be picked up with a tour and a briefing. It was profitable, they were sending “their people” to learn why. Good ‘nuf.

Actually, this pattern happens in nearly every “lean manufacturing implementation” out there. The senior leadership is “committed” to the point where they are willing to hire the experts and have them teach people how to “be lean.” But, in truth, this is about changing the way the company is run. Very few “lean implementations” succeed without a transition in top leadership. Of those which do succeed, few of them survive the next leadership transition unless that person was carefully developed within the system.

Kaizen is a process of learning, and only people can learn.


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4S, 5S, 6S

Staight left an interesting post on The Whiteboard a couple of days ago:

You’ve discussed 5S but Novaces, for example, has a 6S system. I think it would be great if you talked about different consultant companies and their processes.

Novaces, it turns out, is a consultancy apparently based out of New Orleans. In the nature of full disclosure, I have to say that I know nothing about them other than what is on their web site plus they (apparently) teach 6S rather than 5S. I render no opinion either way about their competency or capability.

There are a lot of good consultancies out there. There are a lot of mediocre ones. There are some that are charlatans. I suppose one of the great ironies of the business is that, if you are capable of reliably vetting them on their competency, you probably don’t need them in the first place.

For the sake of the discussion, though, I want to limit myself to the population of really good ones. These are the ones who are primarly there to teach the clients how to engage in the kind of sharp critical thinking that charactarizes high-performance organizations.

The good consultancies will have an approach that applies the same principles. And here is the key point:

As long as the basic principles of the thinking structure get embedded, it really does not matter that much how they do it. If a consultancy wants to differentiate itself by using 6S, or 4S, instead of 5S, there is little difference in the result if they are any good.

Let’s take the different numbers of ‘S’ and really take a look at why this is true.

Though they may have adapted 5S today, originally (a long time ago) Toyota taught 4S. The idea of “self discipline” or “sustaining” didn’t come into it because that was embedded thoroughly in the culture. It was taught elsewhere.  Likewise for safety. It isn’t that they leave it out because they didn’t have it called out as an ‘S’, they just include it somewhere else.

What is the 6th S? I don’t know what Novaces uses, but I have most commonly seen it as Safety. It isn’t a bad thing to include it, but in reality, as long as relentless daily problem solving is applied to safety issues somewhere, somehow, there isn’t a right or wrong way to teach it or do it.

Some consultants claim to “fill in the gaps” of “lean manufacturing.” They add hyphens or create three letter abbreviations to differentiate their product. Because the term “lean manufacturing” originally referred to the observed results of the Toyota Production System, and not the system itself, there is a lot of room to make claims that it leaves things out because the method was never really defined in a holistic way.

“Lean manufacturing” not withstanding, IF you stipulate that “lean manufacturing” is the “Toyota Production System” and then understand that, to Toyota, this is their entire management system – it encompasses everything they do – then to claim “lean manufacturing” has gaps is to claim that Toyota somehow leaves something out. I don’t think so. Sure, they slip up like everyone else, but their management system is pretty thorough.

For example, I have heard things like “we are lean, now we need quality.” Hello? If you aren’t obsessive about quality, if you aren’t applying immediate detection, stop, correction and countermeasure investigation to every quality problem, how can you possibly claim you are “lean?” If you aren’t doing these things, you are just making defective goods very efficiently.

But I also understand that there ARE companies that think they have implemented lean, and have totally left out the quality component. So if it makes sense to them, (the customer) to find a consultant to help them “fill in the gap” then great. They still get there.

And that is the point. Getting there.

One last point. To get there you have to pick a course and stick with it. What trips up a lot of companies is they get to the point where they are “stuck” without examining (in the mirror) the factors that are causing it. Instead, they switch course, and say “AH! It must be Theory of Seven Sigma” that will get us there. But in reality, because all of these approaches require a change in the way everyone thinks, without that fundamental shift, they end up in the same place a little later…

Cause remember, no matter where you go… there you are.

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The Market Sets Prices, Not The Supplier

Murdoch says papers should charge on Web – Yahoo! News

Robert Murdoch believes that newspapers will have to start charging people for access to their online editions. That’s well and good, so long as the laws of demand and supply balance at a point where that works.

But so far, that isn’t working. In today’s web 2.0 world, news and quality commentary is available pretty much anywhere.

In the words of a famous folk singer from Hibbing, Minnesota, “The times they are a’changin.”

Still, in times of shifting paradigms, people cling to what they know, and that includes business models that have worked in the past.

I predict we will see the traditional publishers concede more and more of the “everyday” news to the “free” online model, and retreat into what they perceive as more and more specialty premium content.

At some point they will be very good at delivering a product that over-delivers the needs of their customers.

The “flip” described by Clayton Christensen in “The Innovator’s Dilemma” is already occurring in news delivery. This is just part of the story.

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Managing The Burning Platform

David Henry in the UK presented an interesting question on The Whiteboard. He said:

During this economic downturn, is the long term philosophy of lean put at risk by the short term focus on cost reduction? Is that necessarily a bad thing? Does this urgency give opportunity for greater engagement with line management and provide the catalyst for change?

My first thought was a quote cited by Steven Spear from an Emergency Medical Technician:

Air goes in and out. Blood goes round and round. Any variation on this is a bad thing.

Translating, keeping the patient at least marginally alive is always the first priority. And of course that makes sense. It buys time, and that is what is needed.

So back to David’s question.

It is really easy to say that, in these emergencies, long term thinking doesn’t matter. But I contend that it is even more important right now. This is a time for action. It is not a time for panic.

This means that as the company’s leaders look to how to navigate through this rough time, they need to take the time to reflect, develop multiple ideas, and bias execution toward short-term survival and sustainable solutions.

For example, some companies got caught short with a mountain of inventory, and need to convert it to cash. They can always just take the brute force approach and hammer it down by manual micro-management. The problem comes up when sales and production volumes return. They didn’t use the brute force approach at higher volumes because it was impossible to manually manage everything. But whatever they did do at that time (1) is what got them into the problem in the first place and (2) is what they will do next time unless they address the core problem(s).

So, yes, take the necessary short-term actions. But at the same time, look in the mirror and say, out loud, “We are responsible for this.” Embrace that statement, even if it is not completely true. That is what self-empowerment is all about.

Then go and understand the dynamics of your supply chain, what causes orders to actually be placed, why the excess stuff was there (because somebody thought it was necessary), and what changes you can make (mostly to your thinking) that will change the system.

By the way, it is very easy to say “implement kanban” at this point, and yes, that works. But I honestly think a prerequisite is firmly embracing, owning, the concept that what you did before DIDN’T work.

This is one situational example of how to turn these devastating times into opportunities to emerge ready to maneuver when opportunities present themselves. The barriers are mostly between our ears.

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Grassroots Innovation: Business is Like Swimming, Not Running

Grassroots Innovation: Business is Like Swimming, Not Running

Let’s take Greg Eisenbach’s totally on-target analogy and expand just a bit. Greg points out:

…a world class swimmer is only 9 percent mechanically efficient. This means 91 calories out of 100 in swimming are lost due to friction.

For the non-world class swimmer the best way to increase your speed is not to spend more calories, but figure out how to become more efficient. A gain from 3% efficiency to 4% efficiency would represent a 33% increase.

Business is the same way.

This probably explains why a little thing like the new technology in competitive swimming suits had such a huge (and controversial) impact in the 2008 competitive season. In competitive swimming, small advantages are huge advantages.

One of the big differences, though, between swimming and business is that a competitive swimmer knows, in real time, that he is winning or losing. Triathlons aside, a typical swim race is under a minute, a long one might be a couple. In this competitive environment, it is impossible to be complacent and believe you are in the race when, in fact, you are not.

On the other hand, I have worked with a number of businesses (or operations within larger businesses) that have had a truly amazing capacity for denial. What else can explain a headline in a company’s internal newspaper that exclaimed the “big order” when, in fact, the customer had placed a mixed order, giving 80% of it to the competitor… but no mention of that inconvenient truth. So when this company also wonders why people feel “no sense of urgency” you have to wonder. Of course the real story was all over the local news, about how the competitor had gotten the bulk of the order, and how the local company had “lost” it, only getting 20%. What does that do for the corporate credibility? Not much.

World class swimmers are 9% efficient. World class manufacturing value streams are about 40% value-add. (By % value-add I mean the time the product is actually in the value stream vs. the time something that matters is actually being done to it.)

Contrast this with a typical manufacturing flow where the value-add can easily drop into single digits.

This is basic stuff, but sometimes we forget what this lean stuff is about.

Consider a 10% value-add flow. Out of 100 minutes in the plant, 10 minutes are spent actually processing. The other 90 minutes are just sitting, moving, counting, stacking, etc.

Let’s say I spend my time and energy to speed up the value-adding process (like make the chips fly faster, speed up the processing time, find some high-tech fast curing compound). Let’s say I am really successful and cut that value-adding time in half. Whoo-hoo.

Now out of 95 minutes in the plant, 5 minutes are spent actually doing something.

Not exactly a stellar improvement, no real impact on lead time, no reduction in inventory, no reduction in waste. All of the original costs are still there, and I have probably just added more.

On the other hand, if I were to focus my time and energy on reducing that 90 minutes of “other stuff” I run into a couple of realities.

First, all of that “other stuff” costs time, money, space and accumulates inventory. It adds to lead time. Cutting it in half cuts the lead-time from 100 to 55.

And critically important – these changes are typically pretty easy to make. They don’t require engineering or computer science degrees, they just require watching the work and asking “Why is this stopping, why can’t it just go to the next operation right away?”

Greg is dead-on with his analogy. The difference, though, is that there is much higher potential for businesses to improve than there is for swimmers.

But like swimming, small advantages are huge advantages. It isn’t the companies that make the “blitz” type of changes that are sustaining world-class players. It is the companies that, every day, scratch out another little improvement.

It is those “a little every day” companies that, over time, build an insurmountable lead. They engage more of their people, and they learn as an organization what continuous improvement is all about. The “blitz” approach retains the knowledge in the few experts who are responsible for all of the kaizen activity. As good as they may be, they can’t be everywhere.

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GM CEO Wagoner to step down at White House request

GM CEO Wagoner to step down at White House request

I find this news interesting on a lot of levels.

I have never worked at GM, and have never met Rick Wagoner. GM’s current problems have been a long time coming. They are not solely due to the current economic downturn, the market conditions have simply removed the veil.

GM has been steadily losing market share for a long time, while, in my opinion, clinging to the idea that somehow, someday, there would be a spontaneous triumphant return to the good old days. As someone else has said recently, “Hope is not a strategy.” GM has been institutionally unwilling to face harsh realities, and has fallen into the trap of “continuing to do the same things and expect a different outcome.”

Ironically, GM has had for a couple of decades, the best possible insight into their most successful competitor. No other automobile company has had the incredible advantage of unlimited access to a joint venture with Toyota. Everyone else has had to learn from books, consultants, or what they can glean from people they hire in. Not GM. And not just how to run it. They watched the entire process of converting the worst plant they had into the best. On that note alone, I am not sympathetic in any way to GM’s plight. They have just been very good at finding reasons why they couldn’t.

So, all in all, I agree that Wagoner’s time has past, he has had his chance, and he has failed the company.

But now what?

Personally, I think it is time for an outsider, possibly even someone from outside the automotive industry, to take charge. That is what Ford did, and though they are also hurting badly, they are moving in the right direction. The key qualification, in my mind, is someone willing to deal with the truth as it is, and capable of cleaning out the people who operate under any belief system other than “We are responsible.”

Another aspect of this story is disturbing, however. Wagoner’s departure is not at the request of the board of directors (though it should have been). No, it is at the request of the President of the United States. Now with the U.S. Treasury as a significant (and growing, apparently) stakeholder in GM, I suppose he can make that request. But this whole thing is, in my mind, dangerous territory.

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How Do You Look At Problems?

A couple of posts ago, I tried to emphasize “hypothesis testing” as the key, core thinking behind the TPS. For that matter, I think that anyone who truly understands any of the various improvement approaches out there will find the same thinking at the core. Certainly Six Sigma; Theory of Constraints; and TQM are all about surfacing and solving problems. They may use different language, might insert the initial lever between different bricks, but in the end, the approaches all embrace the same basic thinking.

I’d like to put out there an idea that it is the way problems are regarded and approached that separates “gets it” from “business as usual.”

What Constitutes “a problem?”

In “traditional thinking” a problem is something which disrupts output. It is something serious enough that it cannot be ignored.

In a true continuous improvement mindset, anything that causes variation from the plan, in any way, is “a problem.” Any barrier between the current condition and the idealized world is “a problem.”

What triggers a response?

In “traditional thinking” if output isn’t disrupted, spend time elsewhere. There is a caveat to this, however. The parable of the “boiling frog” (whether true for actual frogs or not) can drive an ever higher level of numbness as “normalized deviance”   sets in.

Since continuous improvement is a process of discovering the ideal process, variation from the plan is new information. It must be investigated and understood. If everything is running smoothly, then the problem solving shifts to the next barrier to higher performance.

What triggers alarm in the organization?

This one may be the most controversial. While “stopped production” is certainly cause for alarm and immediate response, in the traditional thinking world, it is the only thing that really gets people’s attention.

In a thinking and learning organization, I would add to the above “No problems are apparent.” If there are no andons, there are no defects, there are no line stops, there are no shortages, there are no disruptions, then there is a BIG problem. I say that because these conditions are impossible and it is only because your system is totally numb that you would not see them.

Target Condition

Given the above, then I think it is safe to offer that silence is equated with “stability” in the traditionally reacting organization. Of course it isn’t stable at all, it is just that there is so much systemic anesthesia that nobody feels anything.

In the continuous improvement mindset, things are running as they should if there is a continuous flow of problem being surfaced and solved. That is the only way to be 100% certain that things are getting better every day.

“Management Commitment”

The term “management commitment” is tossed around as a prime reason for failure of improvement initiatives. There are lots of good reasons for this, but until we really define exactly what leaders need to do every day, stop using euphemisms, and start getting real about leadership’s actual role in this process, we are crutching the problem. This is partly “our fault” because we teach the basics very badly. We put top leaders into “kaizen events” but never explicitly link kaizen to daily problem solving. In doing so, we convince them that if only they support enough kaizen events, the organization will be transformed. The logical result is a monthly report on how many kaizen events have been run. Argh.

If we used kaizen events to explicitly teach the core questions, the rules of good process design, and the concept of applying PDCA to everything, we might get more traction. That can be difficult, but maybe if everyone in the industry starts thinking in terms of a few core mantras we might get a chorus going.

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Setting Up For Success (or failure)

Remember when, a few short months ago, everyone was too busy taking orders and building up all of that inventory that you see out of your window now? Times have changed.

Then again, very few can claim lack of a “burning platform” now. Platform? Today it is more about getting out of the building alive!

Still, a few organizations are trying to drive change into the way they operate, and many more will fail than succeed.

The reasons why this is true were articulated by John Kotter back in 1995 in his now classic article Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail.

The short list is:

  1. Establishing a sense of urgency.
  2. Forming a powerful guiding coalition.
  3. Creating a vision.
  4. Communicating the vision. (Over-communicating!)
  5. Empowering others to act on the vision.
  6. Planning for and creating short-term wins.
  7. Consolidating improvements and producing still more change.
  8. Institutionalizing new approaches.

The question, then, becomes “Are you deploying effective countermeasures against these known failure points?”

I would like to share an exercise I used (admittedly improvised as I went) with a company leadership team a few years ago. It ended up really hitting them between the eyes with the gap between their perception and the reality.

Prior to the day, I had them all read the article.

We spent some time discussing and understanding each of the eight points Kotter discusses.

Then I had each of the little sub-teams we had break out and score how effectively they felt they were dealing with each of these eight items. For example, how well did they rate themselves on “Communicating the vision?” It was a simple numeric rating, 1-5.

Each sub-team then debriefed the group, and found everyone was pretty close to consensus.

In the meantime, we had another group going through the same exercise. This group consisted of the direct reports of the top leadership team.

We compared the numbers. They were very different.

The leaders rated themselves as being pretty effective. Their direct reports were not so kind. We didn’t do it, but it would have been interesting to do the same thing another level down again.

The leaders gained a decent understanding of the huge gap that existed between what they thought they were doing vs. how it was being read by their staff. What the leaders thought was a clear, crisp “change” message was pretty mushy by the time it was filtered through words vs. actions.

Try it in your organization. Assess yourselves. Then do the same assessment with another group a couple of levels closer to reality. See what you get.

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